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THE INCLUSION OF PASSIVE MIGRATION
UNDER CERCLA LIABILITY: WHEN IS
"DISPOSAL" TRULY DISPOSAL?
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental contamination has played a large role in the history
of our country. The Old West was founded and developed on the
principle that the land existed to serve the people and that the resources
it provided were limitless.' Innocent actions such as mining and
smelting, which were the lifeblood of the Western way of life, have made
lasting impacts on the environment, including contamination of surface
and groundwater, that resulted in not only aesthetic unpleasantries but
have also caused potentially deadly problems such as highly toxic heavy
metals being carried in the drainage systems.2 Today, even more
devastating cases of environmental contamination confront our Nation,
and, as a consequence, Congress has taken a more active role in trying to
solve these problems.3
Part of the legislative solution was the passage of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act ("CERCLA"), which was conceived to handle problems of hazardous
1 See Susan R. Poulter, Cleanup and Restoration: Who Should Pay?, 18 J. LAND REs. &
ENVTL. L. 77, 77 (1998). Mining and smelting played large roles in the development of the
West, but both left lasting toxic signs. Id. After the gold, silver, lead, and copper had all
been extracted, the miners moved on to new areas where there were more minerals to be
had. Id. The Mineral Policy Center estimates that there are 560,000 abandoned or inactive
hardrock mining sites in the United States, 15,000 of which are exhibiting contamination
problems. Id.
2 Id. This flow of heavy metals affects wetlands, irrigation water, agricultural crops,
and domestic and wild animals, in addition to humans. Id. Apart from the water damage,
smelting plants caused damage through air emissions that have contaminated surrounding
land and neighborhoods. Id.
3 See Molly A. Meegan, Municipal Liability for Household Hazardous Waste: An Analysis of
the Superfi4nd Statute and its Policy Implications, 79 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1783 (1991). In the United
States, over 43,000 chemical substances are in commercial production, and over 1000 new
chemical compounds are created each year. Id. "The Environmental Protection Agency
has estimated that the United States produces 600 pounds of hazardous waste per person
per year," and more than ninety percent of that waste is disposed of in an environmentally
unsound way. Id. This waste is not only a product of industry. Id. American households
produced approximately 160 million tons of municipal waste in 1989, and much of this
waste was disposed of in municipal landfills and then ignored. Id. Municipal landfills
account for twenty percent of the sites slated for cleanup under CERCLA. Id. at 1784.
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waste disposal.4 Unfortunately, due to the Act's lack of legislative
history and its ambiguous language, several disputes have arisen over
the interpretation of CERCLA.5 One of these disputes concerns the
interpretation of the term "disposal" as it is used in the liability
provisions of CERCLA. This scenario arises when an owner of a
property improperly disposes of hazardous waste on the land. A second
owner, unaware that the property is contaminated, then purchases the
land and eventually sells the land to a third owner. The question
becomes whether the waste that spread through the land during the
second owner's possession is considered "disposal" under CERCLA. 6
Federal courts are split on the issue, with some courts advocating an
active interpretation of the term, where parties are only held liable if they
actively contributed to the contamination of a property. 7 Other courts
advocate a passive interpretation, where parties are held liable for waste
that spreads through the property during their ownership, even if they
had no active role in the initial contamination.8 This split has caused
4 See Robert L. Bronston, Note, The Case Against Intermediate Owner Liability Under
CERCLA for Passive Migration of Hazardous Waste, 93 MICH. L. REV. 609 (1994); Robin C.
Irwin, Note, United States v. CDMG Realty Co.: Rejecting CERCLA's Previous Owner
Liability for Passive and Active Disposal on Motion for Summary Judgment, 23 N. Ky. L. REV.
147, 148-49 (1995); Craig May, Note, Taking Action-Rejecting the Passive Disposal Theory of
Prior Owner Liability Under CERCLA, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 385 (1998).
May, supra note 4, at 385. "CERCLA has spawned a tremendous amount of litigation
Id.; see VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND
LITIGATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO SUPERFUND LAW xv (1992). Because of the
complexity and ambiguity of CERCLA, it provides dubious guidance to people and entities
who are trying to avoid liability. FOGLEMAN, supra.
6 See Patrick D. Traylor, Comment, Liability of Past Owners: Does CERCLA Incorporate a
Causation-Based Standard?, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 535, 543 (1994). "Passive disposal requires only
that hazardous waste already present at the facility move, through no action of the past
owner, into the environment during that person's ownership." Id.; see also Catherine S.
Stempien, Sins of Omission, Commission, and Emission: Does CERCLA's Definition of
"Disposal" Include Passive Activities?, 9 J. ENvrL. L. & LImG. 1, 4 (1994). "Passive disposal is a
tremendous problem because it leads to groundwater contamination and contamination of
property that abuts the initial dumping site." Stempien, supra. This spreading of
contamination increases the time and cost of cleaning up and increases the risk of damage
to natural resources. Id.
7 See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v.
Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
8 See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2000); Nurad, Inc.
v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Bronston, supra note
4, at 610 (discussing the division between the federal courts over the scope of liability of
prior owners). See generally Joseph Lipinski, Comment, Last Owner Liability for Passive
Migration Under CERCLA, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 97 (1998) (analyzing the circuit split
over the definition of "disposal" under CERCLA).
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problems for many landowners.9 People who once owned property, but
who sold it months, or even years ago, are finding themselves liable
under CERCLA for property cleanup costs.'0 Because the courts have
been unable to give a uniform answer about who, as a prior owner, is
liable under CERCLA, countless individuals and entities have been left
to guess about the extent of their liability should contamination ever be
discovered at a facility they once owned.
This Note will discuss the current controversy surrounding the
interpretation of the word "disposal" in CERCLA's liability provision.
Part II discusses the incidents leading up to and the passage of CERCLA,
including the problems that the ambiguous legislative history of the Act
has caused." Part II further examines the liability provision of CERCLA
in relation to the Act's broad remedial purpose and discusses the
controversy surrounding the interpretation of the word "disposal." 12
Part III presents the arguments on both sides of the controversy,
including case law analysis and statutory interpretations used by each
side to defend its position.13 Part IV analyzes these arguments and
demonstrates why the active/passive way of looking at the word
"disposal" is ineffective and creates unnecessary confusion.14 Part V
proposes a more effective way to determine liability under CERCLA in
an attempt to eliminate the controversy surrounding the use of the word
"disposal:" instead of looking at "disposal" as active or passive, the
word should create liability based on the act or omission of a party. ' 5
II. BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA in response to a perceived problem with
the disposal of hazardous waste. 16 The statute was designed to ensure
that hazardous waste disposed of in the past would not become an
9 See J.B. Ruh], The Plight of the Passive Past Owner: Defining the Limits of Superfund
Liability, 45 Sw. L.J. 1129, 1144 (1991). The indecision that has resulted from these cases has
caused uncertainty for countless past owners. Id.
10 Id. at 1130.
11 See infra Part II.
12 See infra Part II.
13 See infra Part Il.
14 See infra Part IV.
15 See infra Part V.
16 JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., THE REGULATION OF ToxIc SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS
WASTES 869 (2000). See generally Alex C. Geisinger, From the Ashes of Kelley v. EPA:
Framing the Next Step of the CERCLA Lender Liability Debate, 4 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 41
(1994) (discussing the reasons for enacting CERCLA).
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environmental disaster in the future.17 One of the first hazardous waste
incidents to draw public attention to the hazardous waste disposal
problem occurred in Love Canal, New York.18 Between 1942 and 1953,
Hooker Chemical Company dumped more than 21,000 tons of chemical
waste on an abandoned site, eventually covering the site with earth and
clay in 1953.19 Hooker Chemical then sold the site to the Niagra Falls
Board of Education for one dollar, and a school and playground were
built on the premises.20 Developers turned the surrounding area into a
residential neighborhood, but, in the early 1970s, homeowners began to
notice a foul odor.21 When an increase in rainfall caused the level of
groundwater to rise, "thick, oily sludge" began to seep into basements
and to accumulate on the ground.22 Health problems-including birth
17 APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 869; see also FOGLEMAN, supra note 5, at 1. The primary
purpose of CERCLA was to enable the federal government to swiftly clean up abandoned
and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. FOGLEMAN, supra note 5, at 1. The secondary
purpose was to make persons who were responsible for the improper disposal of
hazardous waste pay the cost of cleanup. Id.
18 ANALYZING SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 4-5 (Richard L. Revesz &
Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995) [hereinafter SUPERFUND ECONOMICS]; see United States v.
Hooker Chem. & Plastic Corp., 850 F. Supp. 993 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). In 1979, New York and
the United States brought a recovery suit against Hooker Chemical Company for the costs
of cleaning up the Love Canal site. Hooker Chem. Corp., 850 F. Supp. at 997; see also Michael
S. Caplan, Escaping CERCLA Liability: The Interim Owner Passive Migration Defense Gains
Circuit Recognition, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10121, 10122 (1998) (discussing the political climate at
the time CERCLA was created).
19 SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 4-5; see Hooker Chem. Corp., 850 F. Supp. at
1010. Hooker Chemical began using Love Canal as a disposal site around 1941. Hooker
Chem. Corp., 850 F. Supp. at 1004. Hooker Chemical deepened and widened the canal for
waste disposal. Id. at 1007. They generally gathered 500-2000 drums of waste before
hauling them to Love Canal, which occurred about once a month. Id. at 1008. The chemical
waste, which was composed of both liquid and solid chemicals, was usually stored in 55-
gallon metal drums. Id. The drums were used or reconditioned and were described by
some witnesses as rusty and leaking. Id. The drums were covered on the same day they
were dumped, although some drums usually remained uncovered at the end of the day.
Id. at 1009. On occasion, when a drum broke open, workers would be splashed and burned
by the chemicals or have holes burned in their clothing. Id.
20 SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 4-5. See generally MAXINEI . IPELES,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, HAZARDOUS WASTE 276 (3d ed. 1997) (describing the contamination
of Love Canal by Hooker Chemical Company).
21 SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 5; see Hooker Chem. Corp., 850 F. Supp. at
1018. The case quotes residents of Love Canal describing explosions of highly flammable
chemicals at the waste site and burning debris being launched into roads in the residential
neighborhood. Hooker Chem. Corp., 850 F. Supp. at 1017. In addition, other residents told
stories of children playing with exposed drums of hazardous material and others who
described a rash or burning sensation after they swam in the canal. Id. at 1018.
22 SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 5. In addition to the sludge, in 1976, high
levels of insecticide were detected in fish from Lake Ontario, and this was traced to the
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defects, miscarriages, epilepsy, and liver abnormalities-appeared among
residents near Love Canal.23 A public emergency was declared, and the
media began to broadcast the issue nationally, increasing the awareness
and concern of the public.24
Besides Love Canal, other events highlighting the problems
associated with hazardous waste disposal occurred, including the toxic
spill of pesticides into the James River in Virginia, 25 the "Valley of the
Drums" incident in Kentucky, 26 the contamination of the Hudson River
with polychlorinated biphenyl ("PCB"), 27 and the ingestion of PBB by
livestock in Michigan.28 These and other mishaps provoked a legislative
response to the problems affiliated with hazardous waste disposal.
contamination at Love Canal. Id.; see Hooker Chem. Corp., 850 F. Supp. at 1006. The rainfall
caused the groundwater to rise because the area was characterized as having poor drainage
and a fluctuating water table. Hooker Chem. Corp., 850 F. Supp. at 1006.
23 Meegan, supra note 3, at 1784-85 n.13.
24 SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 5. The health commissioner's report on Love
Canal was entitled, "Love Canal: Public Health Time Bomb." Id.; see Hooker Chem. Corp.,
850 F. Supp. at 1069. At the trial, the court concluded that the State failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Hooker Chemical Company's actions displayed
reckless disregard for the safety of others and that all of its actions comported with the
available knowledge and industry practice at the time. Hooker Chem. Corp., 850 F. Supp. at
1069. Therefore, the court did not award punitive damages. Id.
25 Meegan, supra note 3, at 1784-85 n.13 (describing the contamination of the James River
as occurring when a small chemical plant dumped Kepone wastes into the river and caused
a loss of a two-million-dollar-per-year harvest of seafood); see also APPLEGATE, supra note
16, at 678. See generally Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 63 T.C.M. (CCH)
2672 (1992) (defining Kepone as a highly toxic chemical pesticide that is also a possible
carcinogen to humans). Kepone has neurological effects like DDT. APPLEGATE, supra note
16, at 678.
26 SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 5 (describing the "Valley of the Drums"
incident where tens of thousands of barrels of "discarded, leaking, and unlabeled wastes"
were dumped in a meadow in Kentucky).
27 SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 5; see also Meegan, supra note 3, at 1784-85
n.13 (describing the contamination of the Hudson River as being caused by General Electric
dumping polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") into the river, causing the river to be closed
to commercial fishing in the 1970s). See generally United States v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 620 F. Supp. 1404, 1406-07 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (defining PCBs, which are primarily used by
electric utilities in their transformers, as toxic and persistent in the environment).
28 SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 5; see APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 677-78.
PBB, a fire retardant chemical, was accidentally mixed with cattle feed. APPLEGATE, supra
note 16, at 678. Farmers drank and sold contaminated milk before they discovered the
problem, and 25,000 dairy cows had to be killed. Id.
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A. CERCLA: A Legislative History
Congress responded to the hazardous waste disposal problem by
passing CERCLA. President Jimmy Carter signed CERCLA into law on
December 11, 1980, 29 and the statute was amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") in 1986.30 Considered
during the final days of a lame duck Congress, CERCLA was quickly
negotiated and passed by a Senate concerned about sacrificing work
already expended on the legislation.31  Similarly, the House of
Representatives considered the legislation under a suspension of the
rules.32
Due to the accelerated process that Congress used to pass CERCLA,
little legislative history exists, and that which does is ambiguous. 33
29 Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 35 (1982); see
also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1985). See generally
LIPELES, supra note 20, at 278 (discussing the enactment of CERCLA).
30 Kristin M. Carter, Note, Superffind Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986:
Limiting Judicial Review to the Administrative Record in Cost Recovery Actions by the EPA, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 1152, 1152 (1989). The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
("SARA") was signed into law by President Reagan on October 17, 1986. Id. SARA was
enacted to deal with the problems of CERCLA, such as improper political conduct by EPA
officials and the awareness that the hazardous waste problem was larger than Congress
first anticipated. Id. To deal with these problems, Congress, through SARA, wanted to
define cleanup standards, expand the resources available to the EPA to clean up and
investigate, and clarify the authority of the EPA. Id. SARA also provided $8.5 billion to the
EPA over five years to clean up hazardous waste sites. Id.; see William W. Balcke, Note,
Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REv. 123, 133
(1988). SARA is a set of reforms for CERCLA, including issues such as cleanup standards,
federal-state relations, and rules of litigation. Balcke, supra. SARA also provides concrete
settlement guidelines for disputes under CERCLA. Id.
31 Grad, supra note 29, at 19. On the floor of the Senate, during discussion of the
compromised legislation, Senator Humphrey "took the opportunity to comment on the
pressure and rush with which this legislation was being adopted" and that the National
Association of Manufacturers would be supportive of the bill except that they did not like
the "circumstances in which the legislation was being considered." Id. at 26; see also
APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 886 (explaining how CERCLA was passed as a last minute
compromise with virtually no debate); FOGLEMAN, supra note 5, at 2 (discussing how there
was no Senate, House, or Conference report to help explain the actions of the legislature).
32 Grad, supra note 29, at 29-30. A suspension of the rules means that bills must be
passed as they are received and no amendments are allowed. Id.; see also FOGLEMAN, supra
note 5, at 13 (describing how the members of the House complained that the Senate had left
them with a "massive badly-and inadequately-drafted legislation on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis").
33 Grad, supra note 29, at 2; see also Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County,
851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988) (criticizing CERCLA for lack of clarity and precision and for
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Many lower courts have commented that CERCLA has "a well-deserved
notoriety for vaguely drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not
contradictory, legislative history." 34 This lack of legislative history adds
to the difficulty that exists in interpreting the statute and "discerning the
full meaning of the law."35 CERCLA has also been criticized as
"excessively stringent and costly" and regarded as an inefficient
program plagued by high transaction costs and long delays.36
B. Liability Under CERCLA
CERCLA has two broad remedial purposes: (1) facilitating the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and (2) ensuring that those responsible
for pollution pay the costs of cleanup. 37 Congress accomplished the first
goal, facilitating hazardous waste cleanup, by authorizing the President
to respond to releases and by establishing the "Superfund" to pay for
its inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities due to its rapid passage); APPLEGATE, supra
note 16, at 886. "The result [of the hurried passage of the statute] was unclear
draftsmanship and very little legislative history." APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 886. See
generally FOGLEMAN, supra note 5, at xv (describing CERCLA as complex and ambiguous
and claiming that it provides little guidance to people and entities that are trying to avoid
liability).
34 ALFRED R. LIGHT, CERCLA LAW AND PROCEDURE COMPENDIUM I-1 (1992); see
APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 886. Judges have found the statute to be so vague that they
have assumed that Congress intended the courts, by their decisions, to create federal
common law to supplement the statute. APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 886.
35 Grad, supra note 29, at 2; see Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4
F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993) (describing the congressional intent of CERCLA as difficult to
discern with precision due to its lack of clarity and poor draftsmanship).
36 SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 3-4. In reality, the annual cost to the EPA of
CERCLA is between three and five billion dollars, which is a fraction of the cost spent on
air and water pollution regulation. Id.; see Balcke, supra note 30, at 124. Much of CERCLA's
perceived ineffectiveness is due to the immense scope of the problem that it is dealing with.
Balcke, supra note 30, at 124. Recently, the number of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites
has been estimated between 1500 and 10,000, and cleanup costs have been estimated at $10
to $100 billion. Id. In addition, litigation may be extremely costly and time-consuming due
to the large number of Potentially Responsible Parties ("PRPs") involved. Id.; see also
Carter, supra note 30, at 1156 (discussing EPA's average cost of cleanup of a site in 1988 as
between $21 and $30 million).
37 See SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 6; Caplan, supra note 18, at 10125. An
example of this breadth is the language of the liability scheme of CERCLA, which was
intended to be "extensive and far-reaching." SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 6; see
also United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 717 (3d Cir. 1996); Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992); Irwin, supra note 4,
at 147 (relaying the importance of assigning cleanup costs because the approximate cost of
cleaning up a CERCLA site is between $500 and $750 billion); Lipinski, supra note 8, at 104
(discussing the two primary purposes of CERCLA).
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cleanup.38 Congress secured the second goal, making responsible parties
pay for the cleanup, through CERCLA's liability provision.39 CERCLA
defines four groups of people as "Potentially Responsible Parties"
("PRPs") and holds them liable for the cleanup of hazardous waste
sites.40 Congress intended liability under CERCLA to be strict and
retroactive, as well as joint and several.41 However, under CERCLA, a
38 Balcke, supra note 30, at 123; see APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 873. The Superfund is a
revolving trust fund that is used to finance government directed cleanup efforts, to pay
claims arising from the cleanup of private parties who are not liable as PRPs, and to
compensate federal and state government agencies for damage to natural resources caused
by the hazardous waste site. APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 873. The money in the
Superfund is used primarily for sites that are included on the National Priorities List
("NPL"), which includes the worst hazardous waste sites in the country. Id.; see also
FOGLEMAN, supra note 5, at 1. The Superfund was created to help promote the primary
purpose of CERCLA: to enable the government to clean up hazardous waste sites.
FOGLEMAN, supra note 5, at 1. The money can be used to investigate, abate, and clean up
hazards created by abandoned and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. Id.
39 Balcke, supra note 30, at 123.
40 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000). These PRPs include:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance.
Id.; see Steven B. Bass, Comment, The Impact of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act on the Commercial Lending Industry: A Critical Assessment, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 879, 884 (1987).
41 SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 6-7. Strict liability means that no fault or
negligence is necessary for liability. Id. Retroactive liability means that deposits that were
placed before CERCLA was enacted can be the basis for liability. Id. Joint and several
liability holds each party responsible for the cost of the entire cleanup of the site. Id. PRPs
are joint and severally liable if the harm at the site is sufficiently commingled to make it
impossible to determine which wastes were responsible for the release. Id. The burden of
proof is on the PRP to show that the costs are divisible, thereby eliminating the joint and
several liability. Id. Under a strict liability scheme, a PRP "cannot avoid liability by
showing that it met the regulatory or common law standards of care applicable at the time
that it engaged in the activity, or even that it was also complying with hazardous waste
regulatory standards currently in force." Id.; see Grad, supra note 29, at 22 ("The standard
of liability was still intended to be a standard of strict liability."); Bronston, supra note 4, at
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 12
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PRP can sue for contribution if forced to pay for the full cost of cleanup.
42
A private party seeking to initiate a cost-recovery action must prove four
elements.4 3 First, the private party must show a release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance.44 Second, the party must show that the
release was from a "facility" as defined by CERCLA.45 Third, the release
or threatened release must have caused the plaintiff to incur necessary
response costs that were consistent with the National Contingency
Plan.46 Fourth, the defendant must be within one of four statutory
classes of PRPs.47
609 ("CERCLA imposes both strict liability and joint and several liability. ); see also
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apts.,
875 F. Supp. 1545, 1568 (S.D. Ala. 1995); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F.
Supp. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
42 SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 7. The PRP who paid the full cleanup costs
can require other PRPs to pay their equitable share, but the available parties must absorb
the shares of parties who are insolvent or cannot be located at the time of cleanup. Id. It is
common for numerous parties to be insolvent or not located due to the significant periods
of time that often pass before the site is cleaned. Id.
43 Lieutenant Colonel Connelly, Ninth Circuit Holds that "Disposal" Includes Passive
Migration Under CERCLA Section 107, 2000 ARMY LAW. 18 (2000); see also Traylor, supra note
6, at 540-41 (discussing the four essential elements needed to prove liability under
CERCLA).
44 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2000). "Release" is defined as "any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or
depositing into the environment...." Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9); APPLEGATE, supra note 16,
at 957-58. There are three ways that a substance can be deemed hazardous. APPLEGATE,
supra note 16, at 957-58. First, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) sets out a list of hazardous materials
under CERCLA. Id. Second, 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) allows the EPA administrator to designate
as a hazardous substance any substance that, when released into the environment, may
present a substantial danger to public health, welfare, or the environment. Id. Finally, a
substance can be deemed hazardous if it is composed of a mixture of a hazardous and non-
hazardous substances, if somewhere in the mixture there is a CERCLA hazardous waste.
Id.
45 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
"Facility" is defined as (A) any building, structure, installation,
equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or
publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon,
impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance
has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come
to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer
use or any vessel.
Id.
46 See APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 892-93. The National Contingency Plan ("NCP") is
the master plan that governs the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Id. It establishes
procedures and standards for responding to the release of hazardous substances,
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CERCLA provides three defenses to liability.48 PRPs are not liable if
the release or threatened release of the hazardous substance resulted
from an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third party.49
A fourth defense, the innocent purchaser defense, was added by SARA
in 1986.50 This defense can be asserted if, at the time of purchase, the
pollutants, and contaminants. Id. The methodology of the NCP includes identifying the
sites that are most in need of remediation, analyzing the risks to human health and the
environment, setting requirements for state and community involvement in decision-
making, selecting cost-effective remedies, guiding remedial actions using Superfund
money, and setting standards for judging the extent and scope of site cleanup. Id.; see also
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (2000) (explaining that response costs cannot be recovered by
PRPs if the remedial action is inconsistent with the NCP). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9605
(2000) (establishing the NCP in CERCLA).
47 Id. § 9607(a); see Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir.
2000); see also Connelly, supra note 43, at 18.
48 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(3); see Bass, supra note 40, at 884-85.
49 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(3); see id. § 9601(1). An act of God is defined as "an
unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional,
inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented or
avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1); FOGLEMAN, supra
note 5, at 226. The defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the act
of God was the sole cause of the release or threatened release. FOGLEMAN, supra note 5, at
226. Likewise, in order to assert the second defense, an act of war, the defendant must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the sole cause of the release or threatened
release was the act of war. Id. at 227. A showing of proximate cause is not sufficient. Id.;
see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). In order for a PRP to assert the third defense of an act or
omission of a third party, the defendant must assert by a preponderance of the evidence
that the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the
defendant ... if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of
such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions.
42 U.S.C § 9607(b)(3); SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 6-7. The defenses to liability
are very limited, and the only one that has been of any significance is the third-party
defense. SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 6-7. And even in this case, the significant
limitations that are placed on it have lead to very few cases where it has been successfully
established. Id.
50 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35). The defense is established if
(A) the real property on which the facility concerned is located was
acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the
hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the
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defendant did not know, and had no reason to know, that a hazardous
substance was disposed of at the facility.51
Liability under CERCLA is triggered when response costs are
incurred because of the release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance into groundwater, surface water, soil, or air.52 A "release" is
defined under CERCLA as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by
the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not
know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which
is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of, on,
in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by
escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or
through the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or
condemnations.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish
that he has satisfied the requirements of section 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of
this title.
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided
in clause (i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must
have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry
into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with
good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize
liability. For purposes of the proceeding sentence the court shall take
into account any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of
the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the
property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably
ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the
presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the
ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
Id. See supra note 49 for the requirements of § 9607(b)(3).
51 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35). See generally FOGLEMAN, supra note 5, at 229 (discussing the
innocent purchaser defense).
52 SUPERFUND ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 6; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). The PRPs
will be held liable for
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan;
any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or
loss resulting from such a release; and
the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
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emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping,
or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or
discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing
any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant)."5 3 Once a
release, or a substantial threat of a release occurs, the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") has two remedial options.54 The EPA can use
Superfund money to pay for cleanup of the site and then file suit to
recover costs from the PRP, or the EPA can issue an administrative or
court order that requires the PRP to assume the response costs. 55
C. CERCLA: A Disposal Controversy
Recently, a controversy has developed regarding one of the
categories of PRPs.5 6 The section at issue concerns the liability of any
person, who at the time of disposal, owned or operated a facility.57 The
53 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
54 See APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 872 (discussing the steps that can be taken by the
federal government to clean up hazardous wastes cites under CERCLA); Balcke, supra note
30, at 128 (describing the enforcement procedures that the EPA is authorized to take); see
also Bass, supra note 40, at 883.
55 Balcke, supra note 30, at 128. The EPA can exercise the first remedial option under
§ 9607(a) and can require PRPs to initiate the cleanup under § 9606(a). Id.; see Stempien,
supra note 6, at 1-2. CERCLA encourages private cleanup because it is usually cheaper than
an EPA cleanup. Stempien, supra note 6, at 2-3. The EPA spends more money because it
knows it can recover costs from PRPs. Id.; Traylor, supra note 6, at 538 (explaining that
CERCLA presents an overriding policy to recover funds spent out of the Superfund and to
encourage voluntary cleanup by PRPs).
56 See Connelly, supra note 43, at 18 (discussing the elements of a cost recovery action
under CERCLA). The controversy stemming from these cost recovery actions against PRPs
involves the issue of passive migration. Id. Passive migration includes the spreading of
contamination from one part of a contaminated area to another. Id.; Stempien, supra note 6,
at 4. Passive migration is a problem because it leads to groundwater contamination,
contamination of surrounding property, and an increase in cleanup costs as well as a
greater likelihood that natural resources will be damaged. Stempien, supra note 6, at 4; see
also Bronston, supra note 4, at 611 (arguing that this is an important controversy because the
EPA is constantly finding more sites where passive migration is taking place); Irwin, supra
note 4, at 147 (estimating that in 1993, there were approximately 130,000 to 380,000 sites
that were potential candidates for government cleanup and that 75-100 sites will be added
each year).
57 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (emphasis added); see Ruhl, supra note 9, at 1130. Ruh] views
this controversy as dealing with a passive past owner ("PPO") who at one time owned, but
no longer owns, a contaminated property and neither knew of or contributed to the
contamination during ownership. Ruhl, supra note 9, at 1130. These PPOs find themselves
surprised when they are found liable years or even decades after they have terminated
ownership of the property. Id.
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problem centers on the meaning of the word "disposal."58 CERCLA
defines the term as follows:
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous
waste into or on any land or water so that such solid
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof
may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or
discharged into any waters, including ground waters.59
Some courts construe the word "disposal" as having an active
meaning, whereby a party can only be held liable if the party was
responsible for the initial introduction of the hazardous waste into the
property. 60  Other courts treat "disposal" as having a passive
interpretation, whereby a party can be held liable if the party owns the
facility at the time when hazardous waste leaks from underground
storage tanks or seeps into the soil or groundwater.61
A typical scenario involving this controversy arises when a
landowner improperly disposes of hazardous waste, causing the
property to become contaminated. 62 A second owner then purchases the
land from the first owner, uses the property for a different purpose, but
does not add any additional contamination and is unaware that the
original contamination exists. While the second owner possesses the
property, contamination introduced by the first owner spreads through
58 See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996); Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper &
Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Il1. 1992);
Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
59 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000). This definition was adopted from the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Id.
60 See United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2000); ABB Indus. Sys.,
Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1997); CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706; Joslyn
Mfg. Co. v. Koppers Co., 40 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 1994); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland
Apts., Ltd., 875 F. Supp. 1545 (S.D. Ala. 1995); Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp.
1346; Ecodyne Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1454.
61 See Carson Harbor Viii., Ltd., 227 F.3d 1196; Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992); Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d 837; Waste Indus.,
Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (interpreting RCRA's definition of "disposal"); New York v. Almy Bros.,
Inc., 866 F. Supp. 668 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp.
659 (E.D. Cal. 1990); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981) (interpreting
RCRA's definition of "disposal"); In re Hemingway Transp., Inc. v. Kahn, 108 B.R. 378
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
62 Bronston, supra note 4, at 610; see also Caplan, supra note 18, at 10122.
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the property via migration or leaching.63 The second owner then sells
the property to a third owner who possesses the property when the
cleanup action begins. The first owner, who introduced the hazardous
waste into the property, is generally liable, and the owner at the time of
cleanup is always liable for the cost of cleanup. 64 The difficulty arises in
determining whether the second landowner should be held liable as an
"owner at the time of disposal" for owning the land during the time the
contamination spread over the property. 65
In this situation, the interpretation of the word "disposal" becomes
important. If the court determines that "disposal" includes passive
migration, then the second owner is liable for the waste migration that
took place during his ownership, making him liable for the costs of the
cleanup.66 This question currently remains unanswered because of a
circuit split over the meaning of the word "disposal." 67
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: ACTIVE V. PASSIVE MIGRATION
Currently, courts employ two different approaches when
interpreting the word "disposal:" some argue for an active
interpretation while others advocate a passive interpretation. 68 The
existence of reasonable arguments and precedent to support both
positions only increases the confusion. Not surprisingly, no majority
approach exists. As a result, parties to a lawsuit typically have no idea
how the court will analyze their case until after the court has actually
done so. The following Part sets forth the two current approaches and
the cases supporting each position.
63 Bronston, supra note 4, at 610; see Caplan, supra note 18, at 10122 (defining leaching as
the process or an instance of separating the soluble components from some material by
percolation).
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000). The initial owner who contaminated the property is
liable under § 9607(a)(3) as a person who arranged for the "disposal" of the waste at the
facility, and the third owner is liable under § 9607(a)(1) as the present owner and operator
of the facility. Id.
65 See generally id. § 9607(a)(2).
66 Bronston, supra note 4, at 610.
67 See infra Part III for a discussion of the circuit split over the word "disposal."
68 See infra Part III.A-B for the two approaches of interpretation.
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A. Arguments for the Passive Theory of Migration
Courts frequently use several arguments to support the inclusion of
passive migration in the definition of "disposal." 69 One argument
suggests that, because CERCLA's definition of "disposal" was adopted
from the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), the same
interpretation of the word should be used for both RCRA and
CERCLA. 70 Some of the first cases to interpret the word occurred prior
to the passage of CERCLA.71 Congress passed RCRA in 1976 as "a
comprehensive solution to the regulation of hazardous waste disposal." 72
Before the passage of RCRA, Congress issued findings that technological
improvements in manufacturing and the economic and population
growth of the nation, when combined with the continued concentration
of the population in metropolitan areas, had led to an increase in the
amount of discarded scrap and waste material. 73 Congress felt that while
the collection and disposal of hazardous wastes should remain primarily
a function of the state, federal financial and technical assistance was
necessary to develop new and improved processes to reduce the amount
of waste and to provide proper and economical solid waste disposal
practices.7 4 Besides finding that waste production was on the rise,
Congress discovered that the increased output was affecting the
environment and the health of the population. 75 These discoveries made
69 See supra note 61 (listing cases arguing for the passive interpretation of "disposal").
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (2000) (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 6903 for the definition of
"disposal").
71 See United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981).
72 Bronston, supra note 4, at 622; see APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 662 (describing how
RCRA was technically passed as an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965).
73 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(1)-(4) (2000).
74 Id. § 6901(a)(4).
75 Id. § 6901(b)(1)-(8). These findings included the discoveries that
(1) although land is too valuable a national resource to be needlessly
polluted by discarded materials, most solid waste is disposed of on
land in open dumps and sanitary landfills;
(2) disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste in or on the land
without careful planning and management can present a danger to
human health and the environment;
(3) as a result of the Clean Air Act, the Water Pollution Control Act,
and other Federal and State laws respecting public health and the
environment, greater amounts of solid waste (in the form of sludge
and other pollution treatment residues) have been created. Similarly,
inadequate and environmentally unsound practices for the disposal or
use of solid waste have created greater amounts of air and water
pollution and other problems for the environment and for health;
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Congress aware of the need to pass legislation to deal with these
problems, and the result was RCRA. 76
The purpose of RCRA was to "assure that hazardous waste-
management practices would be conducted in a manner that protects
human health, the environment, and the conservation of resources." 77
RCRA encourages recycling research and the establishment of state solid
waste control plans; the statute also includes a "cradle-to-grave" tracking
system known as "Subtitle C," which requires regulation of hazardous
wastes from generation to disposal.78 If waste falls within the structure
and definition of Subtitle C, then it is fully regulated no matter what the
(4) open dumping is particularly harmful to health, contaminates
drinking water from underground and surface supplies, and pollutes
the air and land;
(5) the placement of inadequate controls on hazardous waste
management will result in substantial risks to human health and the
environment;
(6) if hazardous waste management is improperly performed in the
first instance, corrective action is likely to be expensive, complex, and
time consuming;
(7) certain classes of land disposal facilities are not capable of assuring
long-term containment of certain hazardous wastes, and to avoid
substantial risk to human health and the environment, reliance on land
disposal should be minimized or eliminated, and land disposal,
particularly landfill and surface impoundment, should be the least
favored method for managing hazardous wastes; and
(8) alternatives to existing methods of land disposal must be
developed since many of the cities in the United States will be running
out of suitable solid waste disposal sites within five years unless
immediate action is taken.
Id.
76 Id. § 6901; see Dennis B. Danella, Note, Avondle Fed. Savings Bank v. Amoco Oil Co.:
No Equity in Sight for RCRA Victims, 48 KAN. L. REV. 663, 666 (2000). Hazardous waste was
traditionally controlled by state and local regulations, but these regulations proved
inadequate to deal with the immensity of the problem. Danella, supra.
77 Danella, supra note 76, at 666. RCRA's policy states that hazardous "[wlaste that is...
generated should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present and
future threat to human health and the environment." Id.
78 DAVID B. WEINBERG ET AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION HANDBOOK, A PRACrICAL
GUIDE TO RCRA AND SUPERFUND 1 (1983). The "cradle-to-grave" title means that RCRA
regulates hazardous waste from the point of generation to the point of disposal.
APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 680. This "cradle-to-grave" tracking system developed under
RCRA requires the EPA to identify and list hazardous wastes, to set standards for
generators, transporters, and treatment, storage, and disposal facilities ("TSDFs"), to
establish a permitting program for TSDFs, to authorize the states to implement equivalent
programs, and to provide enforcement. Id. at 678; see also Danella, supra note 76, at 667. See
generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6924 (2000).
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actual risk of the material. 79 RCRA encourages states to set up their own
hazardous waste programs, and, through the statute's indirect influence
over the costs and liabilities of waste management, RCRA increases the
attractiveness of recycling and recovery.8 0
Until the early 1980s, the responsibilities established by RCRA under
Subtitle C were neglected because of either another environmental policy
taking priority or the indifference of the administration in power to
environmental regulation.8 ' Between 1980 and 1982, because of a court
order and pressure from Congress and the public, the EPA finally began
to implement the necessary provisions to make RCRA an enforceable
statute.8 2 RCRA, like the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, is
designed to maintain the traditional local control that was historically
associated with waste disposal.8 3 Under RCRA, the EPA, using its
technical expertise, set up detailed guidelines to allow the states to
develop standards and programs. 84
79 RICHARD C. FORTUNA & DAVID J. LENNETT, HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION, THE NEW
ERA 26 (1987). Hazardous waste is defined as
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes that, because of its
quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious
characteristics, may:
1. cause, or significantly contribute to, an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness; or
2. pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or
the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or
disposed of, or otherwise managed.
Id.; see APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 680. Under RCRA, a waste is considered to be a
hazardous waste if it is a listed waste or if it exhibits any of the characteristics defined by
the EPA. APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 707. These characteristics are ignitability,
corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity. Id.
80 APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 678. The costs and liabilities are influenced by RCRA
because of the more stringent regulations that are being enforced on the production of
hazardous wastes. Id. In addition, the tight controls that RCRA exercises over waste
disposal facilities increases both the cost and the difficulty of disposing of wastes, and,
therefore, it provides an incentive to avoid the production of these wastes. Id.
81 FORTUNA & LENNETr, supra note 79, at 10-13; see APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 678.
During the Carter administration, the main focus of environmental policy was on
completing the rules for the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. APPLEGATE, supra note
16, at 678. During the Reagan administration, there was generally no concern for
environmental regulation, so RCRA again was put aside. Id.
82 APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 678.
83 Id. at 679.
8 Id. States are given the funding to implement federal programs, though the EPA must
grant final authorization for the state program to be considered an equivalent of the EPA's
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The main civil enforcement section that the EPA uses under RCRA is
called the "imminent hazard provision."85 Under this provision, the EPA
can obtain injunctive relief for hazardous waste contamination that poses
an imminent hazard to human health or the environment.8 6 RCRA's
imminent hazard provision uses the term "disposal" in much the same
way that CERCLA uses the word.87 Because Congress chose to use the
same definition of "disposal" in RCRA and CERCLA, some courts have
studied RCRA decisions to assist in the interpretation of "disposal"
under CERCLA.88
In United States v. Price,89 Charles Price and his wife owned a landfill
in New Jersey. 90 In 1979, A.G.A. Partnership bought the landfill from
Price, and Price informed A.G.A. that the property had been a landfill.91
program. Id. RCRA does allow states to write standards that are more stringent then the
federal regulations. Id.
85 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (2000). The imminent hazard provision states that,
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt
of evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment, the Administrator may bring suit... against any person
... who has contributed or who is contributing to such handling,
storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to restrain such person
from such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal, to
order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or
both.
Id.; see also Bronston, supra note 4, at 621.
86 APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 802. The EPA can enforce this provision if it can prove
the following: (1) conditions at a site present an imminent or substantial endangerment, (2)
the endangerment is caused or was caused by the handling of hazardous waste, and (3) the
defendant has contributed or is contributing to the hazardous waste that poses the threat.
Id.
87 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a).
88 See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981).
90 Id. at 1058. Although the land was originally used by Price to excavate sand and
gravel for his road construction business, he later began operating it as a landfill and
continued to do so for approximately one year before obtaining a license. Id. at 1059.
Price's original permit for the landfill did not include the acceptance of chemical wastes,
but he disposed of these wastes regardless. Id. at 1060. In addition, once Price did obtain
the proper permit to dispose of solid wastes, he accepted liquid and chemical wastes, in
direct violation of his new permit. Id. Furthermore, the wastes were disposed of in an
unsafe manner by simply burying barrels under the landfill or pouring the waste into the
landfill. Id. In 1976, Price terminated operation of the landfill and covered the site with fill
material. Id. at 1061.
91 Id. at 1058. A.G.A. made no inquiry to Price as to the presence of chemicals or toxic
wastes and never visited the property before the time of purchase. Id. In mid-1979, A.G.A.
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At no time did A.G.A. actively dispose of waste on the property or
contribute to the migration of chemicals.92 However, the company did
nothing to prevent the spread of chemicals on the property.93 The court
first noted that RCRA's definition of "disposal" under § 6903 "is quite
broad." 94 What the court found more significant was the fact that the
definition includes the term "leaking," "which ordinarily occurs not
through affirmative action, but as a result of inaction or negligent past
actions." 95 The court held that RCRA's plain language authorizes relief
to restrain further disposal or spreading of waste that presents an
inminent hazard-the leaking of hazardous waste into groundwater, for
instance.96  Further, the court concluded that the disposal, to be
prevented from spreading, "need not result from affirmative action by
the defendants but may be the result of passive inaction."97 The court
looked at the actions and inactions of the defendants in Price and
determined that the defendants' behavior was the cause of the current
hazardous situation.98 The court also considered the legislative history
of RCRA and concluded that Congress intended the phrase
"contributing to" disposal to be interpreted liberally, that Congress
became aware, through newspaper accounts, that toxic chemicals were buried beneath the
Price property. Id. These toxic chemicals included compounds that, even in low
concentrations, can result in adverse health affects. Id. at 1062. Some of them were
carcinogenic, degrade poorly, and tend to persist in the environment. Id.
92 Id. at 1059.
93 Id. After testing water samples from the area surrounding the Price landfill, the EPA
found significant contamination of the water drawn from wells on the landfill and from the
.surrounding area. Id. at 1062. The defendants, including Price individually and as Price
Trucking Company, argued that they should have been granted summary judgment
against the government's recovery action because, at the time the action was brought, they
were not dumping chemicals in the landfill. Id. at 1069.
94 Id. at 1071; see 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000). The term "disposal" under RCRA is defined
as
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing
of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so
that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof
may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged
into any waters, including ground water.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).
95 Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1071.
96 Id. Though the court held that the imminent hazard provision could be used to
restrain further discharge, they concluded that RCRA does not allow for the general
cleanup of dormant waste disposal sites. Id.
97 Id. at 1071; see Traylor, supra note 6, at 548. In this situation, the natural hydrological
characteristics of the waste and the surrounding soil were the prime causes of the
migration. Traylor, supra note 6, at 548.
98 Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1072.
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realized that past acts could cause present dangers, and that those acts
were intended to fall within the statute even if not explicitly stated. 99 In
holding the defendants responsible under RCRA in the absence of
affirmative conduct, the court interpreted the word "disposal" to include
passive ngration.100
Like the court in Price, the court in United States v. Waste Industries,
Inc.101  held that the definition of "disposal" included passive
migration.10 2 The case involved a landfill operated by Waste Industries
that was investigated for water pollution.103 Waste Industries signed a
contract to establish and operate landfills for solid waste disposal. 1°4 The
landfill in question used a "sand barrow pit" at the disposal facility. 05
The waste placed into the sandpit began to leach through the sand and
entered the groundwater aquifer below.10 6 Residents near the landfill
began to notice that their water was discolored and that it had a foul
taste and smell. 10 7 On account of the contaminated water, many
residents were unable to use the surplus water tanks that the county
installed, while others were forced to drive elsewhere to do their wash or
99 Id. at 1073. Because the court found that Congress realized that past acts could cause
present harms, they also concluded that they, therefore, wanted RCRA to include
retroactive liability so that these past acts would make parties responsible for present
conditions. Id. The court viewed Price's improper methods of storing chemicals in the past
as presently contributing to the leaking of the chemical contaminants into the groundwater
and, thus, making them proper defendants in the case. Id. Because the defendants were
being punished for the current continuing "disposal," the statute was not punishing them
for injuries caused by past acts but for injury caused by the present spreading of the waste.
Id. Further, A.G.A. was a proper defendant because it contributed to the "disposal" of the
waste by its indifference to the hazardous condition, and as a sophisticated investor, it had
a duty to investigate the conditions of the property. Id.
100 Id.; see Irwin, supra note 4, at 152. "Disposal" includes "inaction or negligent inaction
on the part of the past owner." Irwin, supra note 4, at 152. Id.
101 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984).
02 Id. at 165.
103 Id. at 161.
104 Id. This contract was a result of the county having no waste disposal facilities, and the
public was disposing of waste on private property without the permission of the owners.
Id.
105 Id. at 162. A "sand barrow pit" is a hole from which sand is removed that is used for
waste disposal, and, in this case, it was composed of highly permeable sand. Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. Before the operation of this landfill began, the residents had always had high
quality groundwater. Id. After the landfill began to operate, some of the residents began to
suffer from illnesses and side effects of the contaminated water such as blisters, boils, and
stomach distress. Id.
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to abandon their homes entirely.10 8 An EPA groundwater analysis
revealed a large number of toxic chemicals in the water, including
known carcinogens. 109 Moreover, EPA tests indicated that the leaching
and migration of the contaminants would continue indefinitely unless
remedial action was taken. 10 The district court held that there was no
action under RCRA because the statute did not include, as an actionable
claim, the abatement of leaching contamination."' The Fourth Circuit
disagreed and refused to limit the interpretation of "disposal" to include
only active conduct.12
Like the court in Price, the Fourth Circuit examined the term
"leaking" in the definition of "disposal" and concluded that the word
choice implied that Congress intended "disposal" to include "conduct, a
physical state, and an occurrence"-in other words, passive migration.113
The court continued to read the term "disposal" broadly, and, owing to
the word's frequent recurrence throughout the statutory language,
concluded that it must encompass both routine regulatory concerns as
well as emergency situations.114 Congress used this broad language to
close statutory loopholes that might allow harm to be done to the
environment." 5 Again, the court stressed that the Act could be used to
108 Id. These surplus tanks were installed after residents demanded them; although,
because of infirmary or disability, there were still many who could not get to the new tanks
to use them. Id.
109 Id. The chemical contamination was the result of improper disposal practices at the
Waste Industries landfill, and they migrated from the landfill into the residential wells. Id.
The levels of chemicals present in the wells were sufficient to adversely affect human
health and the environment and made the well water unfit for human consumption. Id.
110 Id. at 163. A new water system that had been installed could not remedy the problem.
Id. The contamination continued to spread as precipitation transported the contamination
from the landfill and through permeable soil where it reached the local aquifer and moved
through the groundwater. Id.
ill Id. This claim was ruled as not actionable because the court held that the provision of
RCRA was not intended to apply to past conduct that ended before the enforcement was
sought. Id.
112 Id. The court reached this conclusion partly by looking at where the section is located
in the statute and determined that, due to this location, it was meant to deal with situations
where regulatory schemes have broken down or been circumvented. Id. at 164. The court
also looked to the language of the section that "authorizes the administrator to bring an
action against any person contributing to the alleged disposal to stop such disposal 'or to
take such other action as may be necessary.'" Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000).
113 Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d at 164. The court said that leaking occurs when landfills are
poorly constructed and drums or tank trucks corrode, rust, or rot, releasing chemicals. Id.
114 Id. at 165.
11 Id. The court reasoned that limiting the enforcement of RCRA to situations involving
active conduct would "open a gaping hole in the overall protection of the environment
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enforce liability for past events causing a contemporary problem. 16
Therefore, the Waste Industries court also found the definition of
"disposal" to include passive migration. 117
Because courts have interpreted "disposal" to include passive
migration under RCRA, and CERCLA uses the same definition, some
courts have argued that "disposal" under CERCLA should also include
passive migration.1 8 Two cases, Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons
Co.1 9 and Carson Harbor Village v. Unocal Corp.,120 are the two most
widely cited cases advocating a passive interpretation of "disposal."' 21
These cases base their conclusion, that "disposal" should include passive
migration, on the following factors: (1) the language of CERCLA; (2) the
frustration of CERCLA's purpose; (3) the innocent owner defense; and
(4) the inconsistencies related to the active interpretation. 122
In Nurad, the plaintiff brought a recovery action against William
Hooper for costs incurred in removing several underground storage
tanks.23 From 1905 to 1963, William Hooper & Sons Company
("Hooper") owned the site in question.124 In 1935, Hooper began to
install underground tanks for use in its textile finishing plant and
envisioned by Congress" by not attaching liability to all the parties that should be held
responsible. Id. The court was concerned that this narrow interpretation would leave the
Nation without a means to respond to disasters that resulted from previous poor planning
and that the resources would never be restored to their previous state. Id.; see Traylor,
supra note 6, at 550 (explaining that Waste Industries circumvented the requirements of
RCRA, and to allow them to hide behind the statute would not address the pollution and
would create a loophole in RCRA enforcement).
116 Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d at 166. The court explained this conclusion by stating that
the "[i]mminence [of this section] applies to the nature of the threat rather than
identification of the time when the endangerment initially arose." Id.
117 Id.
118 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (2000). Disposal "shall have the [same] meaning provided in
section 1004 of" RCRA. Id.; see also Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196
(9th Cir. 2000); Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir.
1992) (claiming that because the question was already decided in Waste Industries, the court
is bound to interpret "disposal" as including passive migration); Stanley Works v.
Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp. 659, 664 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (arguing that there is no
distinction between CERCLA and RCRA in terms of the definition of "disposal" because
the definition is "identical under both statutory schemes").
119 966 F.2d 837.
120 227 F.3d 1196.
121 Id.; Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d 837.
122 Carson Harbor Viii., Ltd., 227 F.3d at 1205-10; Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d at 841-46.
123 Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d at 840.
124 Id.
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continued to use the tanks for storage until 1962, when the company shut
down its operations.125 Hooper abandoned the underground tanks and
did not remove the chemicals inside them.126 In 1963, the property was
sold to Property Investors, Inc., and a portion was subdivided and sold
to Nurad in 1976.127 In 1987, the Maryland Department of the
Environment informed Nurad that the underground tanks needed to be
removed or filled with sand or concrete within 180 days.128 Thereafter,
Nurad filed a CERCLA suit for reimbursement against the former
owners for cleanup costs. 29 In its analysis, the Nurad court focused on
two major issues: (1) the language of CERCLA and (2) the policy behind
CERCLA.130
1. Language of CERCLA
In evaluating the term "disposal," the Nurad court, like the Waste
Industries court, examined the words "discharge," "leak," and "spill" in
the definition of "disposal" and concluded that the terms have a passive
component.131 According to the rules of statutory construction, when a
word is defined, the court is bound by that meaning.132 Because the
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. Nurad's operation involved the manufacture of antennae, and, during its
ownership, Nurad did not used the storage tanks that were left by Hooper. Id.
12$ Id.
129 Id. at 841. Nurad filed suit against several former tenants of the property, but the
district court found that only Hooper should be held liable for the cleanup costs. Id. The
district court held that certain other defendants were not liable because they were not
owners at the time of "disposal." Id. "Disposal" was defined by the court as requiring
some element of affirmative participation. Id.
130 Id. at 841, 844.
131 Id. at 845. The court felt bound to follow the Waste Industries decision because
Congress provided that "disposal" should have the same meaning under RCRA and
CERCLA. Id. In addition, the court held that the "aim of both RCRA and CERCLA is to
encourage the cleanup of hazardous waste conditions." Id.; see United States v. Waste
Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal
Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a hazardous waste could easily
"discharge," "spill," or "leak" without the assistance of human participation). "Discharge"
is defined as "a flowing out." WEBSTER'S NEW AMERICAN DICIONARY 148 (Merriam-
Webster eds., 1995). "Leak" is defined as "a crack or hole that accidentally admits a fluid
or light or lets it escape." Id. at 295. "Spill" is defined as "to run out or over with resulting
loss or waste." Id. at 498.
132 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd., 227 F.3d at 1206; see Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-n-Go Foods, Inc., 796
F. Supp. 1171, 1177 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
"Leaking" does not commonly imply an intentional act. Rusted
barrels, radiators, [underground storage tanks] each may "leak"
without anyone's aid or knowledge; moreover, an unseen or
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statute includes these words and their definitions connote a passive
interpretation, the court was bound to read these words as having a
passive meaning and to construe the statute to include liability for
passive migration.133
2. Frustration of CERCLA's Purpose
The Nurad court asserted that using a strictly active interpretation of
the statute would frustrate the statute's policy of encouraging private
parties to voluntarily remedy environmental hazards and that "an owner
could avoid liability simply by standing idle while an environmental
hazard festers on his property." 134 Concerns about a lack of incentive for
parties to clean up hazardous waste sites led the court to conclude that a
broad interpretation of the statute was necessary.135 The court did not
believe that Congress intended a CERCLA liability scheme that would
reward indifference or discourage voluntary cleanup efforts and,
therefore, held that liability extended to the owner of the facility "at a
time that hazardous waste was spilling or leaking." 136
unintended gravity-aided release from these containers would most
naturally be called a "leak." Were one purposefully to refer solely to a
controlled or intentional release of some substance, one would almost
never use the term "leak" to capture that meaning .... Therefore, the
word "leaking," by itself, plainly includes and likely connotes an
unintentional or inadvertent release.
Pantry, Inc., 796 F. Supp. at 1177; see also 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.07, at 227 (6th ed. 2000).
133 Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d at 845. The district court arbitrarily chose not to follow the
definitions of these words, even though the court in Waste Industries had already given the
definition of "disposal" a broad reading. Id.; see Bronston, supra note 4, at 614 (arguing that
the court can infer the passive meaning of "disposal" by inferring from the other words in
the definitional list that Congress intended "disposal" to "encompass a wide variety of
phenomena"); see also Lipinski, supra note 8, at 108.
134 Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d at 845. The court argued that an owner could insulate himself
from liability as long as the property is transferred before remedial costs are incurred. Id.
But an owner who undertakes the cleanup would be held liable as a current owner,
without the need to establish the "disposal" requirement. Id. In this way, the owner who
failed to clean up, and then transferred the property, is rewarded by not being held liable,
while the owner who cleaned the contamination would be liable. Id. This interpretation of
the statute creates a strong disincentive for private parties to initiate cleanup, and this
cannot be what Congress had intended. Id.; see also New York v. Almy Bros., Inc., 866 F.
Supp. 668, 676 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); Stempien, supra note 6, at 20; May, supra note 4, at 391.
135 See May, supra note 4, at 391.
136 Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d at 846. This holding allowed Nurad to recover costs from some
of the prior owners of the property. Id. at 847; see Caplan, supra note 18, at 10122
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One of the most recent decisions including passive migration under
CERCLA's definition of "disposal" applied similar reasoning to reach the
same conclusion as the Nurad court. 37 In Carson Harbor Village v. Unocal
Corp.,138 Carson Harbor Village ("Carson Harbor") owned a mobile home
park from 1977 to 1983.139 Between 1945 and 1983, Unocal used the
property for petroleum production1 40 In 1993, a private environmental
study of the property revealed slag and tar material in the wetland
portion, and further investigation revealed that the material had been on
the property several decades before the mobile home park was
developed.14' Owing to the high levels of lead found in the soil,
environmental agencies decided to clean up the tar and slag.142 After the
material was removed and no further cleanup action was deemed
necessary, Carson Harbor filed suit seeking to recover costs for the
remedial action.143
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that Carson
Harbor could not recover because the spread of the contamination into
the surrounding soil did not constitute a "disposal." 144 Besides agreeing
with the arguments set forth in Nurad, the Carson Harbor court focused
on two additional issues: the innocent landowner defense and certain
(emphasizing that it is ownership and not culpability that triggers liability); Lipinski, supra
note 8, at 109.
137 Carson Harbor Viii., Ltd., 227 F.3d at 1196.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1199.
140 Id. Unocal operated oil wells, pipelines, above-ground tanks, and production
facilities. Id.
141 Id. The study also revealed that the material was from some form of waste or by-
product of petroleum production, the material was four feet thick, covering an area 30 by
160 feet, and the material and surrounding soil contained an elevated level of petroleum
hydrocarbons and lead. Id. at 1200; see also Billie J. England v. A.K. Steel Co., No. CA96-05-
099, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3687, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 3, 1996) (describing slag as
discharge from blast furnaces that occurs during the production process of casting iron).
142 Carson Harbor Viii., Ltd., 227 F.3d at 1200. A remedial action plan was submitted to the
controlling environmental agency, which proposed to remove the tar and slag material,
and the cleanup commenced during the summer of 1995. Id. Over a five-day period, 1042
tons of material were removed. Id.
143 Id. at 1201. The district court granted certain parties summary judgment because the
court held that Carson Harbor could not show that the remedial action was necessary and
that CERCLA was not designed to permit property owners to unnecessarily clean up their
properties and then pass the costs on to others. Id. Further, the court held that Carson
Harbor failed to show that these defendants were owners of the property at the time of
"disposal," as required by CERCLA. Id.
144 Id. at 1206; see Connelly, supra note 43, at 19 (explaining that the district court found
"[m]ere passive migration" insufficient to constitute "disposal").
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inconsistencies created when the active interpretation of "disposal" is
used.145 The court analyzed the statutory definition of "disposal" and
determined that a spill or leak could occur without human participation
and concluded that, because the definition includes passive activities, it
was bound to give the word "disposal" that effect. 146 The court also
interpreted the purpose and structure of CERCLA as supporting the
inclusion of passive migration. 147 CERCLA's goal is primarily remedial,
and the statute's provisions should, therefore, be interpreted liberally, in
favor of liability. 148 That a passive meaning should be given to the term
"disposal," is supported, not only by a broad reading of CERCLA, but
also by CERCLA's emphasis on strict liability.149 The Carson Harbor court
found that the statute imposes strict liability on owners at the time of
"disposal." 150 The court also noted that Congress designed CERCLA to
"create a mechanism for prompt cleanup" and that Congress had
knowledge that many parties responsible for pollution were insolvent or
no longer in existence and, accordingly, would be unable to contribute to
the cost of cleanup.' 5' Therefore, causation requirements would not be
as effective because the cleanup would simply not occur if the parties
who were responsible under causation could not pay; on the other hand,
145 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd., 227 F.3d at 1208.
146 Id. at 1206-07. The Ninth Circuit rejected a "strained reading" of "disposal" and found
the arguments for passive migration to be straightforward. Id. at 1207; see Connelly, supra
note 43, at 20.
147 Carson Harbor Viii., Ltd., 227 F.3d at 1207. This purpose and structure included
providing "for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous
substances released into the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste
disposal sites." Id.
148 New York v. Almy Bros., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 668, 674 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); see Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992); see
also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)
(concluding that statutes such as CERCLA, which were enacted for the protection and
preservation of public health, should be given an extremely liberal construction for the
accomplishment of their beneficial objectives).
149 Carson Harbor Viii., Ltd., 277 F.3d at 1207. CERCLA was enacted to impose the costs of
cleanup on responsible parties, but because Congress was aware that many of these parties
would be insolvent, they abandoned causation requirements and created a strict liability
scheme. Id. The view that CERCLA liability can only be triggered by active disposal is at
odds with this strict liability emphasis. Id. Liability is triggered under CERCLA by being
an owner or operator of a facility at the time of "disposal." Id. The statute does not
mention the need for any culpability or responsibility for the contamination. Id. By
requiring the liable party to have actively disposed of the waste, the court would be
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if a showing of causation was not required, more parties could be joined
to pay.152  By this reasoning, the court decided that an active
interpretation would create a causation analysis not intended by
Congress. 5 3
3. Analysis of the Innocent Landowner Defense Under Passive
Migration
While the Nurad court was not confronted by the innocent
landowner defense, the Carson Harbor court held that the passive
interpretation does not discredit the theory, which applies if the property
was acquired "after the disposal or placement of the hazardous
substances."154 Some had argued that by construing "disposal" to
include passive migration, the innocent landowner defense would never
apply.155 But the innocent landowner defense actually applies if the
property "was acquired ... after the disposal or placement of the
hazardous substance[s] .... "156 The Carson Harbor court concluded that
the defense is still applicable because, by using the word "placement"
instead of "disposal," Congress intended the defense to apply even
though wastes were passively migrating, so long as the defendant
acquired the property after the wastes were placed on the property. l5 7
This is true even if hazardous wastes were passively migrating during
the defendant's ownership, so long as the defendant acquired the
property after the hazardous wastes were deposited.158
4. Inconsistencies Created by the Active Theory of Disposal
Finally, the Carson Harbor court held that an active theory of
"disposal" would create certain inconsistencies, such as Congress
152 Id.; see also Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 (4th Cir.
1992). "The trigger to liability under § 9607(a)(2) is ownership or operation of a facility at
the time of disposal, not culpability or responsibility for the contamination." Nurad, Inc.,
966 F.2d at 846.
153 Carson Harbor Viii., Ltd., 227 F.3d at 1207.
154 Id. at 1209-10 (emphasis omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (2000); United States v.
CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 716 (3d Cir. 1996); see also supra note 50 for the statutory
language of the innocent landowner defense.
155 See CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 716. The court concluded that under the passive
theory, contamination would constantly be spreading, and, therefore, there would be no
point in time after "disposal." Id. Showing that the facility was purchased after "disposal"
is a necessary element to invoke the innocent landowner defense. Id.
156 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
1s7 Carson Harbor Viii., Ltd., 277 F.3d at 1210.
158 Id.
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distinguishing between current and former owner/operators1 59
Another inconsistency created by the active interpretation is the
irrational distinction between prior owners. 160 After reviewing the
statute and considering these factors, the court adopted the passive
theory of "disposal" and held that Carson Harbor could proceed with its
cost recovery claim against the defendants. 161
5. Cases Supporting Nurad and Carson Harbor
Other cases have found the reasoning of the Nurad and Carson Harbor
courts persuasive. The courts deciding these cases have adopted the
reasoning of the Nurad and Carson Harbor courts entirely. The court in In
re Hemingway Transport, Inc.162 used the reasoning of the Nurad court to
determine that the definition of "disposal" should convey a passive
interpretation.163 In Hemingway, a chain of ownership for the property in
question took place between 1974 and 1983.164 During its ownership,
Juniper, the current owner in the chain of title, received a "Notification
of Potential Liability" from the EPA. 165 This notification was followed by
an Administrative Order that made Juniper aware that barrels and soil
on its property contained hazardous substances and that there was the
159 Id. Under the active theory, it is assumed that Congress wanted to create a distinction
between current and former owners. Id. This distinction would hold current owners liable
without regard to fault, but it would create immunity for prior owners, unless they owned
the property during an act of "disposal." Id. In addition, the court argued that under this
theory, Congress must have intended a distinction between prior owners. Id. Owners
during passive migration would be exempt even if they did not conduct a reasonable
investigation into the environmental condition of the facility and even if they allowed
known, pre-existing waste to remain untreated. Id. On the other hand, past owners at the
time of an active "disposal" would be liable along with the current owner, even if they
were in no way responsible for the "disposal." Id.
160 Id. This is best exemplified by looking at an owner who held property while waste
was passively migrating. Id. This owner would be exempt from suit even if he failed to
review the property for environmental contamination or allowed a known, pre-existing
condition to remain untreated. Id. But a prior "owner at the time of disposal" would be a
responsible party, along with the current owner, even if the prior owner was not
responsible and had no connection to the "disposal." Id.
161 Id.
162 108 B.R. 378 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989), vacated by 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1993).
163 Id. at 382.
164 Id. at 379. Hemingway leased the property from Woburn from 1974 to 1980. Id.
Bristol, a subsidiary of Hemingway, owned the property from 1980 to 1983. Id. On May 18,
1983, Juniper purchased the property from Bristol and was the owner of the property at the
time the case was heard. Id.
165 Id. at 380. The notification indicated that a representative from the EPA had found
fifty-five-gallon drums on the property. Id. These barrels were discovered after the EPA
was notified of their presence by a local cable television station. Id.
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presence of an actual or threatened release of the substances owing to
past, present, and potential migration.166 After being informed of the
barrels and the hazardous substance, Juniper took remedial action to
clean up the property. 167 On the other hand, Hemingway took no action
to remedy the contamination, and Juniper sued Hemingway for response
costs.16s
The court in Hemingway used the language of the court in Price and
agreed that "the definition of 'disposal' is quite broad" and, more
significantly, like the court in Nurad, focused on the inclusion of the
word "leaking" in the definition.169 Using the analysis and arguments of
other courts, the Hemingway court decided that disposal should include
passive migration and that Hemingway should be required to pay
Juniper for response costs.170
In New York v. Almy Brothers, Inc.,171 another case following the
precedent set by Nurad and Carson Harbor, the McMahon family owned a
piece of property purchased from a company that had used the site for a
milk processing and ice cream manufacturing plant.172 Part of the land
was later sold to Almy, whose representatives noticed several barrels on
the property. 73 Almy asked the McMahons to remove the barrels, and
the McMahons complied by moving them to another part of the site not
owned by Almy.174 The McMahons then sold another part of the
166 Id. The barrels that were discovered were described as rusted and overturned and as
having semi-solid, tar-like substances leaking from them. Id. at 381. The substances that
were leaking from the barrels were examined, and lubricating oil was found in the test
sample. Id. Though the experts involved could not accurately determine when the
contamination had occurred, they indicated that the chemicals that were found in the
barrels, when mixed with rainwater, could contaminate the groundwater. Id.
167 Id. at 380. Juniper spent $8,555.61 on the cleanup of the property. Id. at 381.
168 Id. Hemingway was informed and was required to help with removal of the barrels
because it was considered an "owner at the time of disposal." Id.
169 Id. at 382. The court also looked at RCRA and at the definition of the word "disposal"
as functional and said that "waste is disposed under this provision if it is put into contact
with land or water in such a way as to pose the risks to health and environment that
animated Congress to pass RCRA." Id.
170 Id. at 384.
171 866 F. Supp. 668 (N.D.N.Y. 1994).
17 Id. at 672.
173 Id. The barrels were found to contain pesticides and other hazardous substances. Id.
at 674. The condition of the drums was disputed. Id. at 673 n.6. The State claimed that
they were old and deteriorated and that many were rusting and cracking. Id. On the other
hand, the McMahons, in several documents, described all of the drums on the property,
and only one drum was described as rusted. Id.
174 Id. at 672.
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property to Stilloe, who also noticed barrels on the property, but the
McMahons refused Stilloe's request to remove them.175 The court, in
keeping with Nurad and other previous cases, held that the McMahons
disposed of the barrels when they abandoned them and left them to
deteriorate. 176 Moreover, the court adopted the reasoning of the Nurad
court and concluded that if courts adopted the active interpretation of
"disposal," then "[a]n owner could avoid liability simply by standing
idle while an environmental hazard festers on his property." 177 The
court held that liability was triggered, not merely by active involvement
in disposing of hazardous waste, but also by ownership of property
when leaking or spilling occurred. 178 Using the reasoning of the Nurad
decision, the Almy court agreed that "disposal" should include passive
migration.179
B. Arguments for the Active Theory of Migration
Not all courts have agreed that Congress intended a passive theory
of interpretation. 180 The courts in United States v. CDMG Realty Co.181 and
United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc.182 found five basic arguments
persuasive in concluding that "disposal" requires an affirmative action
to create liability. 183  These arguments include: (1) the language of
CERCLA; (2) the innocent owner defense; (3) the goals of CERCLA; (4)
175 Id. at 673. Stilloe had entered into a written contract with the McMahons to remove
personal property, debris, and other stored materials before the closing of the property
sale. Id. In addition, the contract stated that, if the EPA required Stilloe to perform
removal of the materials mentioned in the contract, the McMahons would reimburse Stilloe
for expenses. Id.
176 Id. at 676. The court held that the barrels were abandoned when the McMahons failed
to comply with their written contract with Stilloe. Id. at 674; see Lipinski, supra note 8, at
112.
177 Almy Bros., Inc., 866 F. Supp. at 676 (quoting Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons
Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992)). The court refused to adopt an interpretation that would
create liability for a current owner who took no affirmative action with the barrel while a
former owner would face no liability at all. Id.; see Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d at 845.
178 Almy Bros., Inc., 866 F. Supp. at 676. After reviewing an affidavit regarding the
widespread contamination of the property around the areas where the drums were located,
as well as Mr. McMahon's testimony regarding the movement of the barrels, the court
found that the barrels were leaking during the McMahons' ownership. Id. at 677.
179 Id.
180 See supra note 60 (listing cases arguing for the active interpretation of "disposal").
181 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996).
182 806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
183 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 718; Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1352.
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the two-step process of disposal envisioned by Congress; and (5) the
concepts of release and disposal.1 4
In CDMG Realty Co., the land in question was formerly part of a
municipally-operated landfill that received hazardous chemical waste
from pharmaceutical and chemical companies. 185 The landfill was closed
in 1972 after numerous complaints about odor, fires, lack of proper
cover, and dead animals.186 In 1981, Dowel Associates purchased the
landfill property, which was vacant at the time of purchase and which
remained vacant while owned by Dowel.1 87 In 1987, Dowel sold the
property to HMAT, disclosing that the property was once part of a
landfill and that the site was under investigation as a possible Superfund
site.188 Subsequently, HMAT was sued for cleanup costs and filed a
third-party suit against Dowel for contribution.189 In reaching its
decision, the court focused on: (1) the language of CERCLA; (2) the
innocent owner defense; and (3) the goals of CERCLA.19°
1. The Language of CERCLA: Rules of Statutory Construction
The Third Circuit began its interpretation in CDMG Realty by
examining the language of the statute's definition of "disposal." 191 The
court began by using noscitur a sociis, a canon of statutory construction
that means that one can infer the meaning of a word by examining the
surrounding words.192 The words "discharge," "deposit," "injection,"
184 See discussion infra Part III.B.1-5.
185 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 711. The landfill received approximately 750,000 pounds
of hazardous chemicals from a pharmaceutical company, along with 3,000,000 gallons of
wastewater from a chemical company. Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. Neither Dowel nor anyone else deposited waste at the site during Dowel's
ownership, and its only activity on the property was soil investigation to determine if the
land could support construction. Id. Dowel was then notified that the property was going
to be investigated for environmental contamination and that it was potentially a liable
party. Id.
188 Id. at 712.
189 Id. HMAT was a PRP because it was the current owner of the property, and it argued
that Dowel should be held liable as a former "owner at the time of disposal." Id.
190 Id. at 714, 716, 717.
191 Id. at 714; see Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979) (using the principles of
statutory construction by noting that "our starting point must be the language employed
by Congress"); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962) (stating that courts begin with
the assumption that "the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used").
192 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 714; see Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (reading the word "disposal" to include only active participants based on
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"dumping," and "placing" all "envision a human actor." 193 Based on the
principle of noscitur a sociis, the proper connotation to give words that
are more ambiguous, "spilling" and "leaking," for example, is that of the
surrounding words, which the court found have active connotations.194
Accordingly, the court rejected the possibility that passive migration
could constitute "disposal" because the two words that arguably have a
passive connotation, "spilling" and "leaking," must be read as active due
to the surrounding words.195
In addition to noscitur a sociis, another canon of statutory
construction, ejusdem generis, supports an interpretation of "disposal"
including only active conduct. 196 Using this principle, the general terms
"spill" and "leak" in the definition of "disposal" must be read as
analogous to the specific terms (i.e. "deposit," "dump," and "place"). 197
This results in all of the words in the definition having an active
meaning.198
the totality of the meaning when the words in the definition are read together); see also
Irwin, supra note 4, at 161. Before applying a statute, a court must look at statutory
construction. Irwin, supra note 4, at 161. If the language is plain, then the court must
enforce the statute accordingly. Id.
193 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 714; see Bronston, supra note 4, at 616.
194 Bronston, supra note 4, at 616. According to this principle, the words "discharge,
deposit, injection, dumping, and placing" indicate the proper connotation of spilling and
leaking. Id. All of these verbs envision a human actor and, therefore, indicate that
Congress intended an active version of these words. Id.; see Lipinski, supra note 8, at 99
(discussing an earlier decision by this same court that cautioned against relying on canons
of statutory construction when interpreting CERCLA due to its "inartful crafting").
195 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 714. The court also made the point that, although both
spilling and leaking can occur without a human actor, neither of them "denote the gradual
spreading of contamination alleged" in this case. Id. The court did not decide that passive
migration could never constitute "disposal" but held more narrowly that it did not in this
case. Id. "Leak" in this case was not applicable because there was no opening in the
container, and, likewise, "spill" did not apply because it is a sudden rush, not a gradual
movement as was present in this case. Id.; see Lipinski, supra note 8, at 99.
19 Bronston, supra note 4, at 616; see Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 117 (1944) (declaring
that the canon ejusdem generis is used to construe general words as having the same
meaning as those words specifically defined); see also Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train
Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991) ("Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when a
general term follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to
subjects akin to the one with specific enunciation.").
197 Bronston, supra note 4, at 616-17. The common element of these terms is that they are
carried out by a person, rendering "disposal" a word that requires active conduct. Id.; see,
2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (6th ed. 2000); see also
Irwin, supra note 4, at 155.
198 Bronston, supra note 4, at 616.
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The court further supported its active theory interpretation by
examining the word "release" and noting that the term "leaching" is
used in its definition but is not used in the definition of "disposal." 199
The court found that the inclusion of "leaching" in the definition of
"release" confirms that Congress was aware of the term and of the
concept of passive migration and, further, that Congress could have
explicitly expressed the concept if it had so desired. 200 Because of this
awareness, the court concluded that, if Congress had intended to include
passive migration in the liability scheme of CERCLA, it would have
included the word "leaching" in the definition of "disposal," or it would
have created liability based on release and not disposal.201
2. Analysis of the Innocent Landowner Defense Under Active
Migration
The CDMG Realty court relied upon the innocent owner defense and
stated that the defense would be rendered meaningless if "disposal"
were interpreted under the passive theory.20 2 To be entitled to the
defense, the defendant must have purchased the facility after the
"disposal" of the hazardous waste, but if "disposal" includes passive
migration-the constant spreading of contaminants-there would be no
point in time after "disposal," making the defense theoretically
impossible.20 3 The court concluded that Congress would not have
intended to create a useless defense and, therefore, must not have
intended passive migration to be included in the definition of
"disposal." 2°4 Others, however, argue that the innocent landowner
199 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 715. The word "leaching" is commonly used in the
environmental context to describe the migration of contaminants. Id. Leaching is "the
process or an instance of separating the soluble components from some material by
percolation." Id. Leaching through rain and groundwater is the principle cause of
contaminant movement in landfills. Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 716; see supra note 50 for criteria of the innocent landowner defense; see also
United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(arguing in favor of the active theory because otherwise the innocent owner defense would
be rendered useless).
203 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 716; see ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d
351, 358 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Lipinski, supra note 8, at 102. The court also concluded that,
because the defense is limited to current owners, passive migration is not included in
"disposal." Lipinski, supra note 8, at 101-02.
2W CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 716; see Bronston, supra note 4, at 628. By referring to a
time after "disposal," Congress clearly envisioned "disposal" as an act with distinct
beginning and ending points. Bronston, supra note 4, at 628. Congress also showed that
A.: The Inclusion of Passive Migration Under CERCLA Liability:  When
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002
326 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 37
defense allows for the purchase of land after the "disposal" or placement
of the contamination and that the defense has validity because placement
could be considered a one-time event.205 In response, the CDMG Realty
court held that because the word "placement" is included in the
definition of "disposal," the use of the word "placement" in the language
of the innocent landowner defense is redundant.2 6 The court solidified
its position regarding the innocent landowner defense by drawing a
comparison between current and past owners of a contaminated
property.20 7 After considering the inconsistencies that would be created
for these parties if passive migration were included in the definition of
"disposal," the court concluded that Congress did not intend such an
irrational regime.20 8
3. Principal Goals of CERCLA
Finally, the CDMG Realty court looked at CERCLA's principal goals,
specifically, forcing polluters to pay for their pollution.2°9 The court
"disposal" and "placement" are similar concepts, both requiring an affirmative act. Id.
Both of these concepts reaffirm that Congress intended "disposal" to require active
conduct. Id.
205 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 716 n.7.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 717. The court hypothesized that, if "disposal" excludes passive migration, then
past owners will generally only be liable as "owners at the time of disposal" if they have
committed an affirmative act of "disposal" on the property. Id. They would then have no
need for an innocent landowner defense because they had committed an affirmative act of
"disposal" and would not be able to meet the criteria to assert it. Id. The necessary criteria
include not contributing to the contamination of the property, exercising due care with
respect to the hazardous substance, and taking precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of third parties. Id. On the other hand, if prior owners were being held liable for
waste that spread passively during their ownership, and the innocent landowner defense
was only available to current owners, then the past owners would be worse off than the
current owners, even if they did not know that the contamination was present. Id; see 42
U.S.C §§ 9601(35), 9607(6) (2000).
208 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 717; see Rita H. McMillen, Liability for "Passive" Disposal of
Hazardous Substances Under CERCLA, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 274 (1993). Under the principle
of fairness, a person who merely owns property in a chain of title should not be responsible
for costs associated with cleanup of the contamination. McMillen, supra, at 274. The
person did not benefit from the "disposal" and would not benefit from the cleanup because
the person no longer owns the property. Id. It would thus be "unfair" to hold that person
liable for response costs. Id.
209 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 717. Though CERCLA was passed with two principal
goals, facilitating cleanup and forcing polluters to pay, the court focused on the second one
to show that its holding was consistent with CERCLA. Id.; see Lipinski, supra note 8, at 104
(explaining that the decision will further advance the goals of CERCLA as a strict liability
statute because present owners will remain liable for cleanup costs).
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determined that a person who owned property that was previously
contaminated and who played no part in spreading the waste could not
be characterized as a polluter. 210 The CDMG Realty court, therefore,
ruled that "disposal" does not include passive migration.211
In Petersen, the United States attempted to recover funds spent on the
remedial investigation of a site operated by Petersen.212 In 1982, the
Forest Preserve District chose the Petersen land as the site for a
recreational lake and uncovered a storage barrel during construction.213
The EPA investigated and held the Forest Preserve liable for the cleanup
of the site.214  After the Forest Preserve's initial cleanup, the EPA
investigated and determined that, while the site did contain hazardous
substances above naturally occurring levels, the site was basically safe.215
The United States sued Peterson, claiming that it was responsible for the
costs of the investigation because it operated the site when passive
disposal occurred. 216 In reaching its decision, the court relied upon the
210 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 717. The court argued that excluding these individuals
from liability under CERCLA would not let the actual polluters off the hook. Id. If the
contamination is disclosed in the process of selling the land, then the selling price will
reflect the cost of CERCLA liability. Id. If the contamination is not revealed, and the seller
has knowledge of it, then the seller is liable for response costs, even after the transfer. Id.
The only prior owners who will avoid paying all cleanup costs are those who bought and
sold the land with no knowledge of the contamination. Id.; see Bronston, supra note 4, at
637.
The active reading of disposal ensures that liability under section
107(a)(2) rests squarely where it belongs: on the environmental
polluters who created the risk that hazardous waste would enter the
environment and who received the economic benefits of doing so, and
on those who discovered the contamination but refused to take action
to remedy the problem.
Bronston, supra note 4, at 637.
211 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 718. Although the court ruled that the passive theory was
incorrect, it did find that the boring of holes into the soil, which HMAT performed while
conducting the soil investigation, may be a form of "disposal" under the active theory that
CDMG could pursue. Id. at 719. The court stated that "'[dlisposal' thus includes not only
the initial introduction of contaminants onto a property but also the spreading of
contaminants due to subsequent activity." Id. Therefore, soil testing that disperses
contaminants may constitute "disposal." Id. at 722.
212 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1348 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Allegedly, Petersen allowed hazardous waste
to be disposed of in an area of land that was used to mine sand and gravel. Id.
213 Id. The barrel was uncovered when it was struck by a bulldozer during construction.
Id.
214 Id. The Forest Preserve cleaned up the site through a private contractor. Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 1349. The action brought by the United States was for more than $800,000 for the
investigation. Id. Petersen then "filed a third-party complaint for contribution from seven
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reasoning of the CDMG court, while also focusing on: (1) the two-step
process of disposal envisioned by Congress and (2) the concepts of
release arid disposal. 217
4. Two-Step Process of Disposal
The court acknowledged that holding more parties liable for cleanup
might further CERCLA's objectives but noted that courts must recognize
that statutes have "not only ends, but also limits." 218 The court held that
passive disposal does not trigger liability and found that the definition of
"disposal" justified this conclusion.219 The court noted that the definition
of "disposal" states that waste "may enter the environment or be emitted
into the air or discharged into any waters." 220 But the migration inherent
in passive disposal is "itself an entering of the environment; it is not a
predicate to entering the environment." z2 1 The court found this to be
persuasive in interpreting "disposal" under the active theory. 22
5. Release v. Disposal
Further, the court in Petersen, like the CDMG Realty court, discussed
the relationship between the terms "release" and "disposal" and held
defendants." Id. Most of these third-party defendants were allegedly liable for the
disposal of fly ash, a hazardous byproduct of coal combustion. Id. In order for the United
States to recover from Petersen, CERCLA requires it to show that "there was a 'release' or
'threatened release' of a 'hazardous substance,'" that the site is a facility, that "the release
caused the United States to incur response costs," and that Petersen is a responsible party.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).
217 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1351-53.
218 Id. at 1350. Laws such as CERCLA do not operate to pursue their ends to the logical
limits, and it is the job of the courts to enforce stopping points. Id. at 1351. The additional
parties that could be added are those who own or operate the land while passive migration
is taking place but who did not dispose of hazardous substances themselves. Id.; see
Bronston, supra note 4, at 636.
219 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1351; see Bronston, supra note 4, at 618. In
the definition of "disposal," Congress envisioned a two-step process. Bronston, supra note
4, at 618. First, the polluter disposes of the waste, and then the pollution actually leaches
into the environment. Id.; see also May, supra note 4, at 393; Traylor, supra note 6, at 558
(arguing that passive migration fails the two-part test established by Congress).
220 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1351; see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2000).
221 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1351. The court argued that Congress was
aware of this difference when it defined the term "release" in the statute. Id.; see Bronston,
supra note 4, at 618 (arguing that if the process of migration is itself "disposal," then the
second step of the definition is meaningless and goes against Congress' intent of creating a
two-step process).
M Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1351.
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this to be illustrative of congressional intent.3 The definition of
"release" encompasses more events than the definition of "disposal,"
making the concept of the former broader than that of the latter.
224
Therefore, while every "disposal" could qualify as a "release," every
"release" would not constitute a "disposal." 225 Under this theory, if no
second-hand movement of a contaminant at a facility is required to be an
affirmative and voluntary action to be classified as "disposal," then a
danger exists of collapsing "disposal" into "release." 226 Because of this
definitional difference between the two terms, courts have held, and
commentators have insisted, that Congress must have intended a
distinction.227 The term "release" is used to activate the entire response
scheme for CERCLA.228 On the other hand, the statute limited operator
liability to those operating a facility at the time of "disposal." 229 Because
Congress limited liability to operators during "disposal," but not
"release," the court concluded that the distinction Congress intended
was between active and passive events. 230
Next, the Petersen court, like the CDMG Realty court, discussed the
innocent owner defense.231 The court concluded that, for the defense to
2D Id. The term "release," in its definition includes the word "disposal," but the
definition of "disposal" does not include "release." Id.
224 United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 714 (3d Cir. 1996); see Bronston, supra
note 4, at 631. The fact that "release" has both active and passive words in its definition
and that it includes "disposal" leads to the conclusion that Congress intended "release" to
be broader than "disposal." Bronston, supra note 4, at 631; May, supra note 4, at 393; see also
Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1351 (agreeing that the word "release" includes
certain types of passive migration but arguing that, because "release" is a broader concept
than "disposal," the same inclusion of passive migration does not hold true for "disposal").
225 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1351; see May, supra note 4, at 393.
226 Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apts., Ltd., 875 F. Supp. 1545, 1563 (S.D. Ala. 1995).
227 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1351; Bronston, supra note 4, at 632.
Because "release" contains passive components, it makes sense to limit "disposal" to an
active meaning. Bronston, supra note 4, at 632. If "disposal" is interpreted to include
passive migration, then "disposal" and "release" become essentially interchangeable terms
with no difference between them. Id.
M2 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1351; see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (2000).
229 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1351; see Lipinski, supra note 8, at 100
(commenting on the distinction between "disposal" and "release" as defined by Congress);
see also supra note 40 for the listing of liable parties under CERCLA.
23 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1351; see United States v. CDMG Realty
Co., 96 F.3d 706, 716 (3d Cir. 1996).
231 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1351-52. This defense can be used if the
property is acquired by the defendant "after the disposal or placement of the hazardous
substances on, in, or at the facility," and if, at that time the defendant acquired the facility,
"the defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance
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be effective, "disposal" requires active participation; otherwise, "any
seeping or leaking on a site occurring after the purchase would eliminate
the defense." 232
Further, the court rejected the suggestion that the active theory
would allow owners who do nothing to stop the spread of hazardous
waste through a property to avoid liability. 233 The court maintained that
the innocent owner defense would not be available to an owner with
actual knowledge of a release who later transferred the property without
disclosing the release.234  Moreover, the Petersen court noted that
purchasers have an incentive to investigate for contamination before
purchasing land and that state common law would protect purchasers
from an owner who failed to disclose contamination.235 The court
concluded that purchasers have an incentive to investigate because
contaminated property is more difficult to resell than uncontaminated
land.23
6
6. Cases Supporting CDMG Realty and Petersen
Other cases have followed the reasoning of the Petersen and CDMG
Realty courts and found that "disposal" includes only active conduct.237
In ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. v. Prime Technology, Inc., 238 ABB bought a
piece of property and tested it for hazardous chemical contamination. 239
which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the
facility." Id. at 1352; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (2000).
232 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1352. Because passive migration is
constantly at work, "this defense would be available only to innocent owners who are
fortunate enough to have purchased a facility where all the hazardous waste is sealed in
concrete." Id.; see Irwin, supra note 4, at 163 (giving "disposal" a passive meaning would
defeat the purpose of the innocent landowner defense).
233 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1353; see Irwin, supra note 4, at 168.
CERCLA has not preempted all state environmental law, and liability could stffil be
imposed by the state on an owner who does not fully disclose information regarding the
contamination of the property to a potential buyer. Irwin, supra note 4, at 168. Some states,
such as New Jersey, have enacted full disclosure laws. Id. Although these laws may be in
place, it is still always in the best interest of a buyer to protect himself by investigating the
land or providing a contingency in the purchase agreement. Id.
234 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1353; see Bronston, supra note 4, at 639
(commenting that CERCLA provides incentives for potential buyers to inspect the property
and guard against liability).
235 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1353. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35).
The innocent landowner defense requires that the person asserting the defense did not
know or have reason to know that the facility was contaminated and that all appropriate
inquiries regarding the facility were made. Id.
236 Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1353.
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The test results indicated that contamination occurred both before and
after ABB acquired the property, and ABB then began an extensive
cleanup of the site.240 ABB argued, however, that the previous owners
were liable under CERCLA for passive migration of contaminants
occurring during their ownership.241  The ABB court followed the
reasoning of the CDMG Realty court and noted that none of the terms in
the definition of "disposal" refer to "gradual spreading of hazardous
chemicals already in the ground."242 The court additionally cited CDMG
Realty and used its arguments regarding the distinction between
"disposal" and "release," the implication that the innocent landowner
defense would be rendered useless under the passive interpretation, and,
finally, that the passive interpretation of "disposal" would be
inconsistent with the policies of CERCLA. 243  In borrowing past
arguments advocating an active interpretation of "disposal," the ABB
court reaffirmed the previous rulings. 244
Likewise, the court in Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah245 agreed with the active
interpretation of "disposal" and concurred with the reasoning of the
previous decisions giving the statute such an interpretation. 246 While
Ecodyne owned a parcel of land, the company constructed wooden
water tower tanks and treated the wood with a chemical preservative
containing hazardous substances. 247 Ecodyne soon discovered that the
chemicals had leaked into the ground, resulting in elevated levels of
chemicals in the groundwater.248 Ecodyne reported this discovery to the
proper authorities and developed a plan for remedial action.249 Several
237 See ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1997); Ecodyne
Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
23 ABB Indus. Sys., Inc., 120 F.3d 351.
239 Id. at 354.
240 Id. Since the testing indicated that the contamination may have occurred prior to
ABB's ownership, ABB researched the prior ownership of the property and sued the prior
owners under CERCLA for remedial costs. Id.
241 Id. ABB alleged that hazardous chemicals, which a prior owner had spilled, continued
to spread while the other owners controlled the property. Id. at 357.
242 Id. at 358. The court refused to express an opinion on the term "leaking" as used
when a prior owner acquired a site with leaking barrels, even if the owner's actions were
purely passive. Id.; see United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 714 (3d Cir. 1996).
243 ABB Indus. Sys., Inc., 120 F.3d at 358 (citing CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 716).
244 Id.
245 718 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
246 See Lipinski, supra note 8, at 105.
247 Ecodyne Corp., 718 F. Supp. at 1455.
248 Id.
249 Id.
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months later Ecodyne sold the property to Shah at a reduced price.250
The property was then sold several more times, each time at a reduced
cost in consideration of the new owner assuming responsibility for the
contamination problems. 251  The conditions at the property only
worsened, however, and by the time of suit, Ecodyne had been ordered
to clean up the site.252 Ecodyne then sought recovery costs from past
owners of the property. 253 The court, following the reasoning of the
CDMG Realty court, applied a canon of statutory construction, noscitur a
sociis, and found that the language of the definition of "disposal" implies
an active element.254 Next, the court noted that, if "disposal" includes
passive migration, then § 9607(a), which lists the categories of PRPs,
becomes a catchall provision that makes all owners after the initial
contamination liable regardless of whether they contributed to the
contamination.255 This reasoning led the Ecodyne court to conclude that
all of the words in the definition of "disposal" require someone to
affirmatively do something with the hazardous substance and, therefore,
that CERCLA liability requires an active reading of "disposal." 256
IV. ANALYSIS: WHY THE PASSIVE AND ACTIVE VOCABULARY IS AN
INEFFECTIVE WAY TO LOOK AT "DISPOSAL"
It is "contrary to CERCLA's remedial scheme to draw an arbitrary
line between current owners, who would be liable regardless of
culpability, and past owners, who would be liable only if they were
culpable."257 The arbitrary line that has thus far been drawn is between
active and passive disposal. This Note proposes that this is not the
proper way to look at the word "disposal." Regardless of whether
"disposal" is analyzed using the active or the passive interpretation, both
20 Id. The property was sold for $1.45 million, a price allegedly reduced by $1.5 million.
Id. The reduced price was in consideration of the fact that Shah would assume
responsibility for cleaning up the contamination at the property. Id. at 1455-56.
251 Id. at 1456.
252 Id.
253 Id. The defendants claimed that they did not own the property at the time of the
"disposal," but the plaintiffs contended that the migration of the chemicals during their
ownership should be enough for "disposal." Id.
254 Id. at 1457; see United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 714 (3d Cir. 1996).
255 See Lipinski, supra note 8, at 105.
256 Ecodyne Corp., 718 F. Supp. at 1457. The court concluded that, no matter how broad
Congress may have intended the definition of "disposal" to be, that intention does not
justify distorting the statute. Id. Instead of relying on legislative history, the court applied
statutory and grammatical interpretation to reach its conclusion. Id.
257 Stempien, supra note 6, at 11.
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create problems that are contrary to the purposes and language of
CERCLA. This part analyzes the arguments that have been set forth
advocating both the passive and active interpretations of "disposal." 258
Part IV.A discusses the problems that exist when courts rely on statutory
interpretation to discover legislative intent. 2 9 Part IV.B discusses the
problems that are created by using the passive interpretation of
"disposal," including the contradiction of the innocent owner defense
and the Fairness Doctrine.26° Part IV.C discusses the problems that are
created when using the active interpretation of "disposal," including the
frustration of CERCLA's purpose and the inconsistent treatment of the
parties involved.261 This part concludes that both the passive and the
active interpretations of "disposal" create far too many inconsistencies
and are an ineffective and inappropriate means of interpreting
"disposal" when determining who should be held liable under
CERCLA. 262
A. The Language of CERCLA: Statutory Interpretation at Its Worst
Statutory interpretation involves the search for legislative
meaning. 263 The starting place to determine what a statute means should
be the language of the statute.264 If the language in the statute is clear,
then the inquiry should end, but if the language is unclear, or the plain
meaning of the statute cannot be applied, then the inquiry needs to
continue.265 To give statues meaning when their plain language is
258 See infra Part IV.
259 See infra Part IV.A.
260 See infra Part IV.B.
261 See infra Part LV.C.
262 See infra Part V for a more accurate way to analyze this problem.
263 ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIc LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 6 (1997).
264 Id. at 9; see Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). "It is elementary that
the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the
act is framed." Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485; KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 36-37 (1999). The words of the statute are important
because they are what was voted on and enacted, they are most easily available to the
public, and they are the most solid indication of what the legislature wanted to do.
GREENAWALT, supra, at 36-37; see also Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. Of
Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989).
265 Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485. If the statute is "plain, and if the law is within the
constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole function of the
courts is to enforce it according to its terms." Id.; see MIKVA & LANE, supra note 263, at 10.
Sometimes the plain language of a statute cannot be applied because it will cause absurd
consequences or go against legislative intent. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 263, at 10. An
example of such consequences is a statute prohibiting blood in the streets that cannot be
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unclear, many courts use canons of statutory construction-general
presumptions about legislative intent-or they rely on the legislative
history of the statute.266 When the language of the statute is unclear, the
next step, according to the rules of statutory construction, is to look for
legislative intent in the legislative history of the statute. 267
Unfortunately, CERCLA has little or no legislative history.268 Moreover,
some commentators argue against the use of legislative history to
determine the intent of the legislature.269 Because CERCLA has no
legislative history, many courts use canons of statutory construction to
discover the meaning of the statute.270
Courts frequently use canons of statutory construction to determine
legislative intent when it is not clear from the language of the statute or
held applicable to emergency surgery. Id. Judge Posner has commented that "[m]eaning
depends on context as well as on the semantic and other formal properties of sentences."
Id. There are several reasons why the meaning of language in a statute would be unclear.
Id. at 20-22. These include the following: (1) "words are not perfect symbols of
communication of ideas;" (2) "statutes are, for the most part, drafted in general terms,
addressing categories of conduct;" (3) "legislatures sometimes use general language,
contemplating that it will be defined by administrative agencies;" (4) "legislative
compromises are struck to secure votes for enactment;" and (5) "ambiguities are created
because the legislature has given insufficient thought to the meaning of the language
employed or because it simply has not considered the question that has become the subject
of litigation." Id.; see also Bradley v. Austin, 841 F.2d 1288, 1293 (6th Cir. 1988);
GREENAWALT, supra note 264, at 45-57 (commenting that the purpose of the statute does not
always match with the language, and judges have occasion to decide against the plain
language of the statute).
266 MIKVA & LANE, supra note 263, at 22. Canons of statutory construction are "judicially
crafted maxims for determining the meaning of statutes. Id. at 23. In the case of Portland
General Electric Co. v. Bureau ofLabor & Industries, 859 P.2d 1143 (Or. 1993), the court laid out
the level of interpretation analysis for statutes: "1. the text and context of the statutory
provision, as a starting point; 2. the legislative history, if, but only if, the intent is not clear
from the text and context legislative; 3. canons of construction, if legislative history does
not provide an answer." Id. at 50.
267 See Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 859 P.2d 1143; MIKVA & LANE, supra note 263, at 22.
268 See supra Part II.A for a discussion of CERCLA's legislative history.
269 GREENAWALT, supra note 264, at 177. There are several arguments against using
legislative history to determine the intent of the legislature. These arguments include the
following: (1) "legislatures enact statutes, not legislative history;" (2) "legislative history is
insufficiently accessible or of little value;" (3) "the history is too easily subject to
manipulation or misperception;" (4) "its use breeds poor drafting and irresponsible
legislative activity;" (5) "constitutional values preclude legislatures' effectively delegating
responsibility for statutory meaning to subgroups of legislators." Id.; see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 16 (1994) (commenting that legislative
intent is usually not recorded).
270 See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 714 (3d Cir. 1996).
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from the legislative history.271 Though they are used regularly, canons of
statutory construction are disfavored, and many commentators criticize
them for creating an unwarranted presumption of legislative intent.272
The consensus is that canons may provide some guidance for courts and
the legislature, but that they should not be used as strict rules of
interpretation.273
In the case of CERCLA, and, more specifically, its liability provisions
and the term "disposal," advocates for both the passive interpretation
and the active interpretation have tried to use the statutory language to
defend their positions.274  Those advocating passive migration as
"disposal" have argued that the plain language of the statute is clear and
that the courts have a duty to enforce the statute as written.275 The court
in Nurad concluded that it was bound to follow the language of the
statute and include passive migration in the definition of "disposal"
because words such as "discharge," "leak," and "spill" all have passive
components. 276  Moreover, the court was bound to the passive
interpretation of "disposal" because the RCRA cases found "disposal" to
include passive migration.277
271 MIKVA & LANE, supra note 263, at 22; see GREENAWALT, supra note 264, at 201. Canons
of statutory construction can be divided into several categories. GREENAWALT, supra note
264, at 201. William Eskridge divided them into the following: "precepts of grammar,
syntax, and logical inference (the textual canons); rules of deference to the interpretations
others have placed on the statutory language (the extrinsic source canons); and policy rules
and presumptions (the substantive canons)." Id.
272 MIKVA & LANE, supra note 263, at 26. Richard Posner has said of them, "the usual
criticism of the canons ... is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is
an equal and opposite canon, so that the outcome of the interpretive process depends on
the choice between paired opposites-a choice the canons themselves do not illuminate." Id.
at 25. In addition, Karl Llewellyn has said that "there are two opposing canons on almost
every point." Id.; see ESKRIDGE, supra note 269, at 16-47 (discussing the many different
theories of statutory construction that are used); see also GREENAWALT, supra note 264, at 203
(describing some common objections to the use of canons stating that "[t]he canons are no
help, they do not reflect ordinary use of language, and that they conflict with each other").
273 GREENAWALT, supra note 264, at 205. Karl Llewellyn has said that canons cannot be
taken as infallible rules but only as aids in context. Id. Canons can give legal guidance
about achieving objectives, but they are "too uneven to provide much assurance about the
way particular language will be interpreted if its apparent meaning is unclear." Id. at 211.
274 See CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 714; Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966
F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992).
275 Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d at 845.
276 Id.; see Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal, 227 F.3d 1196, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000).
277 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (2000). The term "disposal" shall have the meaning provided in
RCRA. Id.; see Nurad, 966 F.2d at 845 (commenting that RCRA and CERCLA both have
similar goals-to clean up hazardous waste conditions).
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In contrast, the courts that have found that "disposal" requires an
affirmative act have concluded that the language of the statute is unclear
and have relied upon two canons of statutory construction to read the
statute as supporting their position. The two canons that have been used
are noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.278 Using these canons, the court
in CDMG Realty found that the terms "leak" and "spill," which some
courts found to have a passive component, must be read in the context of
the other words in the definition and must take their meaning from those
other words.279  Therefore, "leak" and "spill" in the definition of
"disposal" must also have an active meaning. 280
As many commentators have noted, the problem with relying on
statutory construction is that advocates on both sides of an issue can
manipulate the language of the statute and use the canons of
construction to reinforce their positions. That the language of CERCLA
is unclear is exemplified by the vast amount of litigation the statute has
triggered. 281 Therefore, the argument that the plain language of the
statute requires the court to include passive migration is incorrect. 282
The words used in the definition of "disposal" have both active and
passive components, and there is no indication of congressional intent in
the language of the statute itself.283
Next, courts can attempt to discover legislative intent by looking at
the legislative history of a statute, but CERCLA's utter lack of legislative
history offers little guidance. 284 CERCLA was passed quickly and was
the product of a compromise by the House and the Senate. 28 5 The
legislative history has been described as ambiguous at best, making it
278 GREENAWALT, supra note 264, at 202. Both of these canons fall into the category of
textual canons, focusing on grammar, syntax, and logical inference. Id. at 201. Noscitur a
sociis is "the meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of the
words associated with it." Id. at 202. Ejusden generis is "when words of a particular or
specific meaning are followed by general words, the general words are construed to apply
only to persons or conditions of the same general kind as those specifically mentioned." Id.
279 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 714.
280 Id.
281 See supra Part III (discussing the cases involved in the circuit split regarding
"disposal" in CERCLA's liability provision).
282 See Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d at 845.
283 See supra notes 191-194 (discussing congressional intent and the drafting of CERCLA).
2M See supra note 194 (cautioning that statutory construction is dangerous considering
CERCLA's lack of clarity in its drafting).
2S5 See supra Part II.A (discussing CERLA's legislative history).
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difficult, if not impossible, to uncover legislative intent. 286 Because
CERCLA's language and legislative history are ambiguous, courts have
used canons of statutory construction to interpret "disposal" as requiring
an affirmative act.287
The use of canons to discern the intent of the legislature is not highly
regarded. Conclusions based on canons cannot yield authoritative
evidence of legislative intent because canons can be used to manipulate
language; canons are simply assumptions based on no real knowledge.288
For every canon that one side uses, the other side can find a different
canon that will support an opposite conclusion.28 9 Proponents of both
the passive and the active interpretation believe their arguments settle
the meaning of "disposal." But because each side's argument can be
negated by the other's, the arguments based on the language of CERCLA
and on canons of construction do not conclusively resolve the issue of
CERCLA liability.
B. Problems Created by the Passive Interpretation of "Disposal"
1. Analysis of the Innocent Landowner Defense
Under the passive interpretation of "disposal," the innocent
landowner defense, which Congress explicitly placed in CERCLA, is
rendered "merely surplusage." 290 To assert the innocent landowner
defense, the property in question must have been acquired "after the
disposal or placement of the hazardous substance."291 A problem arises
because, under the passive interpretation, "disposal" includes passive
migration or the continuous spreading of hazardous waste through the
property. Because this migration is considered "disposal" and because it
is a continuous process, land can never be purchased "after the disposal".
of the hazardous waste. 292  By effectively abolishing the innocent
landowner defense, the passive theory contravenes Congress' intention
of exempting from liability those parties who acquired land after the
286 See APPLEGATE, supra note 16, at 886 (explaining that "the result [of the hurried
passage of the statute] was unclear draftsmanship and very little legislative history"); Grad,
supra note 29, at 2.
n7 See infra Part III.B.1 for the courts' use of statutory construction in interpreting
"disposal."
2 See GREENAWALT, supra note 264, at 201; MIKVA & LANE, supra note 263, at 25-26.
289 See GREENAWALT, supra note 264, at 201; MIKVA & LANE, supra note 263, at 25-26.
m Stempien, supra note 6, at 12; Bronston, supra note 4, at 628.
291 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (2000).
M Bronston, supra note 4, at 628.
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initial act of pollution.293  Moreover, a presumption exists against
construing a statute or part of a statute in such a way as to render the
statute or part useless.294 From this presumption, as well as from the
inequity that would result from the elimination of the innocent
landowner defense, one can conclude that Congress did not intend for
passive migration to be included in "disposal."
2. Fairness Doctrine: Statute Becomes Overinclusive
Under the Fairness Doctrine, a person who merely owns property in
a chain of title and who neither contributes nor benefits from the
"disposal" should not be held liable for cleanup. 295 Under the passive
theory of "disposal," all parties who were owners at the time of
"disposal," including those who did not affirmatively act to pollute but
who merely owned while passive migration was occurring, are held
liable under CERCLA. 296 This circumstance makes CERCLA
overinclusive because such parties would not normally be considered
"polluters," yet they are being punished under a statute designed to hold
liable only those parties responsible for pollution.297 This result is
manifestly unfair to people who become involved with a contaminated
property but who bear no responsibility for pollution.298
C. Problems Created by the Active Interpretation of "Disposal"
1. Frustration of CERCLA's Purpose
The passive interpretation of "disposal" is not the only theory that
creates problems when analyzing CERCLA liability. The active
interpretation of "disposal" also causes problems by frustrating
CERCLA's purpose and by treating involved parties inconsistently.299
First, under the active interpretation, CERCLA liability is underinclusive,
frustrating the purpose of the statute. The active interpretation
encourages landowners to remain ignorant of hazardous pollution
293 Id.
294 Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 118, 124 (1902).
295 McMillen, supra note 208, at 274.
296 United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 717 (3d Cir. 1996); see 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(2) (2000).
297 WEBSTER'S NEW AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 131, at 402. Pollute is defined as
"to make unpure" and "to contaminate (an environment) with man-made waste." Id.
2,p McMillen, supra note 208, at 274.
299 See Carson Harbor Vill. Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000);
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 844 (4th Cir. 1992).
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buried on their property. 30°  Consider the following scenario.
Landowner A is aware that contamination is spreading over the property
through passive migration. Landowner A chooses not to try to stop the
current spreading or to remedy the damage that has already been
caused. Landowner A then sells the contaminated property to
Landowner B. Under the active interpretation, Landowner A cannot be
held liable because he did not actively place the waste into the ground,
and, once the land was sold to Landowner B, Landowner A could no
longer be held liable as a current owner. The active interpretation, then,
does not further the purpose of CERCLA; rather, it discourages
landowners from voluntarily cleaning up hazardous waste sites, and it
also discourages landowners from becoming aware of what is happening
to their land.301 So long as the landowner sells the property before
anyone discovers the contamination, the landowner does not have to pay
for any of the costs associated with the contamination. 302
The Petersen court attempted to downplay this argument by alleging
that another section in CERCLA would act to prevent an owner from
escaping liability for knowingly transferring contaminated property. 303
The Petersen court explained that the provision would prevent owners of
contaminated property from failing to disclose the contamination and
that only those who were truly unaware of the contamination would be
absolved from liability. 3° 4 Although Congress may have intended this
section to protect potential buyers from such a situation, the language,
structure, and placement of the provision suggest that it is not effective
as a deterrent or as a liability provision.305 The language of § 9601(35)(C)
300 Nurad, Inc., 966 F.2d at 845.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 845.
303 United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1992);
see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (2000). This section states:
Nothing in this paragraph or in section 9607(b)(3) of this title shall
diminish the liability of any previous owner or operator of such facility
who would otherwise be liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding
this paragraph, if the defendant obtained actual knowledge of the
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at such facility
when the defendant owned the real property and then subsequently
transferred ownership of the property to another person without
disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be treated as liable
under section 9607(b)(1) of this title and no defense under section
9607(a)(3) of this title shall be available to such defendant.
Id.; see also Stempien, supra note 6, at 21.
304 Stempien, supra note 6, at 21; see Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. at 1353.
35 Stempien, supra note 6, at 21.
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implies that it was only intended to affect PRPs who try to use the
innocent landowner defense to avoid liability.30 6 If passive disposal does
not give rise to liability, then past passive owners never become PRPs,
and CERCLA cannot reach them.30 7 The language in the first sentence of
the section says that the paragraph shall not diminish liability to those
"otherwise liable under this chapter." 30 8 Again, if a passive past owner is
not otherwise liable as a PRP, then § 9601(35)(C) cannot prevent an
owner who is aware that a site is contaminated from selling the property
without disclosing the contamination. This is against CERCLA's
purpose of encouraging voluntary cleanup of contaminated sites.
2. Inconsistent Treatment of Parties
Another shortcoming of the active interpretation of "disposal" is that
it creates inconsistencies among parties involved with a property. The
first inconsistency is between current and former owners. 3° 9 Under the
active theory, prior owners of a property during the passive migration of
waste would not be held liable because, under § 9607(a)(2), they are not
owners at the time of "disposal," but current owners would be held
liable under § 9607(a)(1), even if they did not affirmatively act to create
the contamination.310 This result is inconsistent and inequitable because
both the prior and the current owner were connected to the
contamination only by passive migration, but the current owner remains
responsible for cleanup costs, while the prior owner faces no liability. 311
A second inconsistency between parties is the irrational distinction
that is created between prior owners.312 This distinction is exemplified
by the following hypothetical. Prior Owner 1 owns property where
passive migration is occurring. If Prior Owner 1 is unaware that the
migration is taking place, or even if he is aware and fails to act, the
passive migration is not considered a "disposal," and, therefore, Prior
Owner 1 will not be held liable. On the other hand, if Prior Owner 2
owns the property at the time of "disposal," even if he was not
connected or aware of the "disposal" in any way, he will be held liable
for the cleanup, along with the current owner of the property. Prior
306 Id.
307 Id.
3- 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C).
30' See Carson Harbor Vill. Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000).
310 See id. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), (2) (2000).
311 See Carson Harbor Viii. Ltd., 227 F.3d at 1210.
312 Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 12
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss1/12
2002] WHEN IS "DISPOSAL" TRULY DISPOSAL 341
Owner 2 was no more responsible for the contamination than Prior
Owner 1. In fact, Prior Owner 1 may have been more culpable for the
contamination if he was aware of the migration of the waste and chose to
ignore it. In any event, Prior Owner 2 will be held liable and Prior
Owner 1 will not. This distinction has no basis in actual responsibility
for the contamination and is, therefore, irrational and inconsistent. Both
of these inconsistencies, between current and former owners, and
between two prior owners, make the active theory of "disposal" an
unproductive and inequitable way to determine CERCLA liability.
An analysis of both the passive and active theories of interpretation
reveals that neither solves the problem of who should be held liable
under CERCLA. To reach a clear and equitable solution to the question,
a new vocabulary must be developed to explain the meaning of
"disposal." 313
V. CONTRIBUTION: Is THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ACTIVE/PASSIVE
INTERPRETATION OF "DISPOSAL"?
This Note proposes that there is a more effective way to look at
"disposal" to determine liability under CERCLA. Because both the
active and passive interpretations cause confusion, a new theory is
needed to determine, in an equitable and sensible manner, what
constitutes "disposal." This Note proposes a theory for determining the
meaning of "disposal" that is based on the acts or omissions of a party.
The concept of act and omission was developed in tort law.314 In this
sphere, no difference exists between active misconduct that causes injury
to others and passive inaction or failure to protect someone from
harm. 315 The difference is that with an act, a new harm is created,
whereas with an omission, the situation has not been made worse.316
313 See infra Part V for an alternative way to analyze the "disposal" question.
314 This is consistent with CERCLA, which is based on nuisance law which is also a
subsection of tort law. See W. PATE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 87 (5th ed.
1984) ("The essence of a private nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyhment of
land.").
315 Id. § 56; see George P. Fletcher, Act & Crime: Act & Omission: On the Moral Irrelevance of
Bodily Movements, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (1994). Omissions can be defined as an
"absence of any willed bodily movements" and an action as "willed bodily movements."
Fletcher, supra, at 1444.
316 KEETON, supra note 314, § 56; see Fletcher, supra note 315, at 1443. Because of this
difference, punishing an omission was seen as more intrusive on liberty then punishing an
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The first people held liable for omissions were those in "public" callings,
or those holding themselves out to the public, because they were
regarded as having undertaken a duty to serve.317 Liability for an
omission was later extended to anyone who undertook to perform for
consideration and then to groups based on their relationship. 318
Generally, liability for an omission requires some relationship between
the parties that imposes a duty to act. 319
In the case of CERCLA liability, by using the act and omission
theory, the duty of an individual arises from his ownership of land and
from the individual's knowledge that a hazardous substance has been
disposed of on the land.320 Landowners have a duty of reasonableness
on their land, so as not to cause any unreasonable risk or harm to
others.321 This duty led to the creation of nuisance law, and nuisance law
led to the creation of CERCLA, which statutorily creates a duty of
reasonableness. 322 Under the act and omission theory, landowners
would be held liable if they acted affirmatively to create hazardous
waste contamination or if they had knowledge that the contamination
took place or that the waste in the land was spreading throughout the
property. Using the act and omission theory to determine who is liable,
and imposing this liability based on a duty created from ownership and
knowledge, does not go beyond the limits or goals that CERCLA was
created to enforce.323 In fact, this theory of determining liability under
CERCLA corrects many of the problems that occur when "disposal" is
interpreted in an active or passive context.
The act and omission theory corrects many of the problems created
under other theories of interpretation and gives certain sections of
act. Fletcher, supra note 315, at 1443. Likewise, requiring particular actions is more
intrusive than prohibiting actions. Id.
317 KEETON, supra note 314, § 56.
318 Id. In this relationship, the plaintiff is typically vulnerable and dependant upon the
defendant who in turn holds power over the plaintiff's welfare. Id.
319 Id.
320 Id. § 57. Imposing a duty based on possession of property is not new to tort law. Id.
The largest area where duty has operated concerns owners and occupiers of land. Id. This
occurs because the person in possession of the land is ordinarily in the best position to
discover and control its dangers. Id.
321 Id. A breach of this duty can occur through intent, negligence, or strict liability. Id.
322 See Keeton, supra note 314, § 87.
323 Bass, supra note 40, at 885. This theory is a way to accomplish the policy concerns
inherent in CERCLA: "the need for effective and expeditious cleanup of hazardous waste
sites to protect public health and the environment, and the need to protect the interests and
legal rights of those innocent parties who may be held liable for such cleanup." Id.
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CERCLA more force than under other interpretations. First, as
mentioned before, under both the passive and active theories of
migration, the courts have battled over the statutory interpretation of the
words in CERCLA's liability clause.324 By using the terms "act" and
"omission," the dispute disappears because both the active and passive
interpretations are included, and landowners can be punished for both
active and passive contamination of their land, depending upon their
knowledge of the situation. Second, under the passive theory of
migration, problems existed regarding the innocent landowner defense
as well as the Fairness Doctrine. 325 Under the act and omission
interpretation, both of these problems are resolved. The innocent
landowner defense is actually strengthened and made more exclusive in
its applicability, which was Congress' intent when it introduced the
defense.326 Congress did not want just anyone to be able to use this
defense to escape liability, and, under the act and omission theory,
where any knowledge of the contamination leads to liability, this goal is
accomplished.327 Only those who are truly innocent landowners, with no
knowledge of contamination, can employ the defense to escape liability.
Also, the Fairness Doctrine looked to the ultimate fairness of the results
when assigning liability. The act and omission theory is consistent with
the Fairness Doctrine because only those who are responsible for the
initial contamination, or those who have knowledge that the
contamination is migrating, are held liable and will share in the cost of
cleanup.
Additionally, the act and omission theory solves the problems that
were created by the active theory of interpretation: the frustration of
CERCLA's purpose and the inconsistent treatment of parties.32 The act
and omission theory is more aligned with CERCLA's intentions because
it punishes the polluters, both those who actively dumped the waste and
those who knowingly allowed the contamination to spread. It also
encourages parties to voluntarily clean up the waste. Because
landowners would be aware that liability stems from their knowledge of
waste migration, they would know that they would eventually be held
liable for the cleanup action. The inconsistent treatment of the parties
324 See supra Part IV.A (discussing problems that arise through the use of statutory canons
to discern legislative intent).
325 See supra Part IV.B (discussing problems created by the passive theory of "disposal").
326 See Bronston, supra note 4, at 627 (categorizing the innocent landowner defense as a
narrow exemption).
327 Id.
328 See supra Part IV.C (discussing problems created by the active theory of "disposal").
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involved is also remedied because the basis for liability is the duty, based
on ownership and knowledge, so there is no room to treat parties
differently. Overall, the act and omission theory fixes the problems
caused by both the active and passive theories and finds a way to hold
responsible parties liable without frustrating CERCLA's purpose.
One way to demonstrate how this theory is different (and more
effective) than existing theories is to look at a typical scenario that arises
in modern passive migration cases. A landowner improperly disposes of
hazardous waste and causes the property to become contaminated. A
second owner then purchases the land from the first owner, uses the
property for a different purpose, but does not add any additional
contamination and is unaware that the original contamination exists.
While the second owner is in possession of the property, contamination
from the first owner begins to spread through the property via migration
or leaching. The second owner then sells the property to a third owner,
and the third owner is in possession of the property at the time the
cleanup action begins.
Under both the active and passive theories of interpretation, the first
landowner is liable because it was through that individual's affirmative
conduct that the hazardous waste contaminated the property. The third
owner would also be liable as a current owner of the property. Under
the active theory, the second owner would not be liable as an "owner at
the time of disposal" because he did not affirmatively act to add waste to
the property, and the leaching of the contamination is not enough under
this theory to create liability. However, under the passive theory, the
second owner would be liable as an "owner at the time of disposal"
because the leaching and migrating of the contamination constitutes
"disposal" and, therefore, triggers liability.
Under the act and omission theory, the result would not be so rigid
and would depend upon the conduct of the parties. The first owner
would still clearly be liable because he was the one who introduced the
contamination into the property. The third owner would also be liable
as a current owner.329 But the second owner would have the ability to
show whether he was in a position to control the contamination. The
factors include whether or not he was aware of the contamination, what
the activities on the property included, and the standard of care that was
taken in researching the property before it was purchased. All of these
329 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2000) (discussing liability for the owner of a facility).
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factors would come into play in determining liability, rather than having
an inflexible rule that could be both under and overinclusive. Under this
scheme, parties are only held responsible if they acted to create the
contamination or if they had a duty to prevent the migration of the
waste.
VI. CONCLUSION
CERCLA provides protection to the public health and the
environment by addressing the problem of hazardous waste disposal
and holding responsible parties liable for any contamination they may
cause. Though CERCLA was passed to deal with the problem of
hazardous waste disposal, the language of the statute itself has caused
problems of its own. Due to a lack of legislative history and an
abundance of ambiguous language, CERCLA has created uncertainties
among property owners as to when they will be held liable for
contamination on their property.
The current scheme of analyzing the term "disposal" as either
passive or active has not clarified this problem or created any certainties
for landowners. Both of these interpretations create problems and
inconsistencies of their own, and neither conforms with the purposes of
CERCLA. By looking at "disposal," not in an active or passive sense, but
by using a new vocabulary, more certainty is created for landowners.
This new vocabulary, consisting of an act and omission standard, allows
landowners to be aware that they will only be held liable if they breach
their duty under CERCLA. This awareness and consistency in
enforcement will further the goals and policies of CERCLA and give
landowners peace of mind when it comes to questions of liability under
CERCLA.
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